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INTRODUCTION
Over the last couple of decades, and particularly since 1998, incredi-
ble advances have been made in the effort to end impunity for sexual and
gender-based violence' committed in the context of war, mass violence, or
Director, War Crimes Research Office (WCRO) and Professorial Lecturer-in-Residence,
American University Washington College of Law (WCL). I am indebted to Beth Van
Schaack, Associate Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law, Theresa
Phelps, WCL Professor of Law, and Maryam Ahranjani, WCL Adjunct Professor for
their comments on previous drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Angelica
Zamora, WCL LLM, and Laura Upans, Ottawa Faculty of Law, LLB candidate, for
their invaluable research assistance.
1. Generally speaking, gender-based violence is rooted "primarily in socially constructed
roles, manifestations, and stereotypes," while sexual violence is "reflected primarily in
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repression. Before this, crimes committed exclusively or disproportionately
against women and girls during conflict or periods of mass violence
were either largely ignored, or at most, treated as secondary to other
crimes. 2 However, evidence of the large-scale and systematic use of rape
in conflicts over the last two decades helped create unprecedented levels
of awareness of sexual violence as a method of war and political repres-
sion.' As a result, great strides have been made in the investigation and
prosecution of rape and other forms of sexual violence at the international
level. Indeed, rape and other forms of sexual violence have been success-
fully prosecuted as war crimes, crimes against humanity,' and even
biological differences." Dorean M. Koening & Kelly D. Askin, International Criminal
Law: The International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes Against Women, in 2 WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 3, 5 n.7 (Dorean M. Koening & Kelly D.
Askin eds., 2000). While these terms "overlap and intersect," there is an increasing
trend to use these terms more precisely. Id.
2. See Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Un-
der International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 288, 296-97 (2003) [hereinafter Prosecuting Wartime Rape]; Barbara Bedont
& Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes Under the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 6 BRowN J. WORLD AFF. 65, 71 (1999) (noting that "in the
tribunals established after the Second World War to prosecute German and Japanese
war criminals, gender crimes were not pursued with the same degree of diligence as
other crimes. Rape was included in the indictments of some of the individuals tried
by the Tokyo Tribunal but not in any of the indictments of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal"); Anne Tierney Goldstein, RECOGNIZING FORCED IMPREGNATION AS A WAR
CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (1993).
3. HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATION-
AL LAw: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 309 (2000) (noting that "extensive media coverage" in
the early 1990s helped create "sufficient outrage ... about the extensive rapes and
other violent assaults against women [in the conflicts accompanying the disintegra-
tion of the former Yugoslavia] to ensure that they could not be ignored, or
discounted as a normal phenomenon of armed conflict").
4. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali6 et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
1 475-96, 511, 544 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter elebidi Trial Chamber Judgment] (affirming that sex crimes are covered
by the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular by
the prohibitions of "torture," "inhuman treatment," "willfully causing great suffer-
ing," and "serious injury to body or health"); Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, Case
No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 11 165, 172 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 10, 1998)[hereinafter Furundiija Trial Chamber Judgment] (recognizing that
rape may amount to violation of common Article 3 and a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions); Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-
96-23/1-T, Judgment, 1 436 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22,
2001)[hereinafter Foda Trial Chamber Judgment] (noting jurisdiction to prosecute
rape as a violation of common Article 3 is "clearly established").
5. See, e.g., Foda Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 539-43 (recognizing rape as
well as contemporary forms of slavery, such as sexual slavery, as crimes against
humanity); Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
1731 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Trial Judgment].
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genocide6 by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established to
prosecute such crimes in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda
(ICTR). Furthermore, the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) incorporates many of these advances,
enumerating a broad range of sexual and gender-based crimes as war
crimes and crimes against humanity.7
Despite these advances, feminist activists and others have critiqued
these tribunals for being inconsistent in their efforts to adequately inves-
tigate and prosecute crimes of sexual and gender-based violence.! A
6. See, e.g., Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 5, 1 731 (recognizing that "rape and
sexual violence . . . constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as
they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a partic-
ular group, targeted as such").
7. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, art. 7(1), [hereinafter Rome Statute] (defining a "crime against human-
ity" as "any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the at-
tack: . . . (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity"); id. art.
8(2)(b) (defining "war crimes" as including: "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework
of international law, namely, any of the following acts: . . . (xxii) Committing rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, para-
graph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions"); id. art. 8(2)(e) (defining
"war crimes" as including "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applica-
ble in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: . .. (vi) Commit-
ting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article
7, paragraph 2 (f, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conven-
tions."; see also Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 6(b)(1) n.3, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/
2000/1/Add.2 (2000) (noting that although rape was not listed as a form of genocide
under Article 6 of the Rome Statute, genocide committed by acts causing "serious
bodily or mental harm" may include "acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhu-
man or degrading treatment").
8. See, e.g., U.N. Research Inst. for Soc. Dev., "Your Justice is Too Slow"' Will the ICTR
Fail Rwanda's Rape Victims?, Occasional Paper No. 10 (Nov. 2005) (by Binaifer
Nowrojee) [hereinafter Rwanda's Rape Victims]; Suzan M. Pritchett, Entrenched He-
gemony, Efficient Procedure, or Selective Justice?: An Inquiry into Charges for Gender-
Based Violence at the International Criminal Court, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 265 (2008); Susana SiCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Importance ofEffective
Investigation of Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes at the International Criminal
Court, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 339 (2009). See alo Gender Report
Cards on the International Criminal Court, WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER
JUSTICE (2005-2010), http://www.iccwomen.org/publicationslindex.php; Sara Kendall
& Michelle Staggs, Silencing Sexual Violence: Recent Developments in the CDF Case at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (2005), U.C. BERKELEY WAR CRIMES STUDIES CTR.,
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separate critique has come from feminist scholars who have highlighted
the unintended consequences of prosecuting such crimes before the Yu-
goslav and Rwanda tribunals, arguing that the prosecution of such
crimes by these tribunals has resulted in the under- or misrepresentation
of the actual experience of survivors of gender-based violence in the con-
text of war, mass violence, or repression. These problems have arisen
largely because the need to establish the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused and to protect their due process rights, to abide by the rules of
evidence and procedure, and to conserve judicial resources all cut
against victim-witnesses' ability to tell their stories at these tribunals,o
thereby resulting in a limited, and sometimes inaccurate, record of vic-
tims' experience. Indeed, while prosecution of rape and other forms of
sexual violence has contributed to the feminist goal of securing recogni-
tion of such violence as among the most serious international crimes, it
has arguably failed to achieve another strategic feminist aim: making the
actual experiences of survivors of gender-based violence and inequality
fully visible."
The question this Article poses is whether victim participation-
one of the most recent developments in international criminal law-has
increased the visibility of the actual lived experience of survivors of sexu-
al and gender-based violence in the context of war, mass violence, or
repression. Under the Rome Statute, victims of the world's most serious
www.ocf.berkeley.edul-changmin/Papers/SilencingSexual Violence.pdf (describing
the decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the case against three members
of the Civilian Defense Forces to expunge witness testimony regarding sexual violence
from the record and exclude the planned testimony of additional victims recounting
acts of sexual violence, on the grounds that the Prosecutor had failed to allege rape
and sexual violence as specific offences under the indictment).
9. See, e.g., Doris E. Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity
in International Criminal Law, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 5 (2007) ("The in-
tersection of gender and ethnicity in the [ad hoc] Tribunals' jurisprudence ... reveals
some of the mechanisms through which sexual violence and gender inequality are
highly visible but only superficially so."); Karen Engle, Feminism and Its Discontents:
Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 778
(2005); Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of TransitionalJustice, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 813, 817-19 (2006).
10. Franke, supra note 9, at 818.
11. Christine Chinkin, Shelley Wright & Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Approaches to
International Law: Reflections fom Another Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MOD-
ERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 17, 27-28 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005)
(citing as "a major concern of those promoting women's international human rights:
avoiding essentialising women and recognising the diversity in the situations and pri-
orities of women around the world"); Buss, supra note 9, at 4 ("For feminist women
and scholars, making women visible to international policy makers has been a central
strategic goal.").
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crimes were given unprecedented rights to participate in proceedings
before the Court. 2 Nearly a decade later, a similar scheme was estab-
lished to allow victims to participate as civil parties in the proceedings
before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC
or Extraordinary Chambers), a court created with UN support to prose-
cute atrocities committed by leaders of the Khmer Rouge during the
period of 1975 to 1979.'" Although there are some significant differ-
ences in how the schemes work at the ICC and ECCC, both courts
allow victims to participate in criminal proceedings independent of their
role as witnesses for either the prosecution or defense. In other words,
both have victim participation schemes intended to give victims a voice
in the proceedings. Significantly, women's rights activists supported the
creation of these victim participation schemes, particularly at the ICC,
because, among other things, they thought that doing so might help
address the under- or misrepresentation of women's experiences in those
situations covered by the Court's jurisdiction.
My aim is to explore whether these novel victim participation
schemes, as implemented by the ICC and ECCC thus far, have actually
allowed for greater recognition of victims' voices and experiences than was
possible in proceedings before their predecessor tribunals. Have these
schemes actually allowed women to communicate a fuller and more nu-
anced picture of their experiences than they would have been able to as
victim-witnesses before the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals? Have they
12. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 68(3).
13. See Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 7), R
23, 91(1) (June 12, 2007), as revised Feb. 23, 2011 [hereinafter ECCC Internal
Rules]. Note that Article 17 of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
("STL"), set up to prosecute persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005
resulting in the death of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or inju-
ry of other persons, also permits victims to participate in proceedings. Statute of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1757, art. 17 (2007) ("Where the
personal interests of the victims are affected, the Special Tribunal shall permit their
views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings de-
termined to be appropriate by the Pre-Trial Judge or the Chamber and in a manner
that is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives
of the victims where the Pre-Trial Judge or the Chamber considers it appropriate.").
The STL's Victims' Participation Unit recently began receiving applications for vic-
tims to participate in proceedings relating to the joint case against Salim Jamil
Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sa-
bra. See "Don't Be a Victim Twice:" Victims' Participation in STL Proceedings,
PRESS RELEASE (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) July 12, 2011. However, this Article
will not address victim participation at the STL, as the Tribunal has yet to issue any
jurisprudence related to how the scheme will work in practice.
14. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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contributed to a richer understanding of the different and complex ways
in which sexual violence and inequality are experienced by women in
the context of war, mass violence, or repression? In other words, can the
victim participation schemes at the ICC and the Extraordinary Cham-
bers answer the feminist call for increased visibility of the actual lived
experience of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in the context
of war, mass violence, or repression? Can they, in this sense, be considered
"feminist projects"?
Admittedly, answering these questions is a difficult exercise, as the
ICC has yet to complete its first case and the ECCC has issued only a
single trial judgment thus far. Moreover, my assessment is based pri-
marily on a review of the tribunals' rules and decisions regarding victim
participation; victims' submissions; transcripts of the proceedings; and
commentary on the experience of victim participants. Although the
analysis would undoubtedly benefit from more direct empirical research, I
have not personally interviewed victims. Nevertheless, the preliminary
conclusions from this analysis are significant and warrant debate for a
couple of reasons. First, victims whose interests these schemes were in-
tended to serve should not have to wait for a frank, albeit preliminary,
assessment of whether participating in these schemes will truly enable
them to tell their stories in ways that were not possible at other tribunals.
This is particularly important for victims of sexual and gender-based vio-
lence, whose experiences have historically been under- or misrepresented.
Second, women's rights activists supported these schemes, at least in part,
because of their expectation that participation would render more visible
the actual experiences of women in periods of conflict, violence, or re-
pression. If the victim participation schemes at these tribunals, as
implemented, have fallen short of expectations, then perhaps we should
acknowledge that the feminist goal of visibility may never be fully
achieved through direct participation in proceedings before internation-
al criminal bodies and invest more in exploring other possibilities that
might be as, if not better, suited to fulfilling that goal. My point here is
not to suggest that victim participation ought to be abandoned alto-
gether, but rather that we should acknowledge the limits of what can be
achieved through these schemes and engage in a broader discourse about
alternatives that might help us advance the project of surfacing'5 the
myriad ways in which sexual violence and inequality are experienced by
women in the context of war, mass violence, or repression.
15. I have taken this term from the late Professor Rhonda Copelon: Rhonda Copelon,
Surfacing Gender: Re-engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HAS-
TINGs WOMEN'S L.J. 243 (1994). Copelon used the term to demonstrate the need to
make apparent previously overlooked gender issues within international criminal law.
302 [Vol. 18:297
I will begin with a brief discussion of the significance of "visibility" as
a feminist goal. From there, I will outline the victim participation schemes
at the ICC and ECCC and briefly examine the concerns that animat-
ed support for the victim participation scheme by feminist scholars
and activists." Next, I will describe how victim participants, particu-
larly survivors of gender-based violence, have fared under these
schemes. Although the ICC and ECCC have only heard a limited num-
ber of cases, the history of participation before these tribunals thus far
suggests that victim participants face some of the same limitations victim-
witnesses encountered at the ad hoc tribunals, particularly in cases against
senior leaders and those most responsible for serious international crimes,
which are the focus of the ICC and ECCC today. In the final section, I
consider the implications of this conclusion on the feminist goal of visi-
bility and, more generally, on the larger question of whether alternatives
to direct participation in criminal trials might be as, if not better, suited
to achieve the realization of this goal. While a full exploration of possible
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article, I suggest that the estab-
lishment and operation of the ICC and ECCC has opened up space for
the emergence of other mechanisms that offer a unique opportunity to
further this goal. For instance, both the ICC and ECCC have expanded
their victim-related activities to include non-judicial programs designed to
assist victims.11 Because they are not part of the formal trial process,
16. The discussion is largely focused on the ICC, as the role of victim participants in
proceedings before the ECCC was not explicitly discussed during the negotiations
leading up to the adoption of the agreement between Cambodia and the United Na-
tions which set up the basic framework for the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders.
See David Scheffer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in 3 IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 220, 253 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008) (noting that
"[t]he ECCC ... was never conceived of by those who negotiated its creation as an
instrument of direct relief for victims, although the protection and use of victims as
witnesses in the investigations and trials is addressed in detail"). Moreover, there is no
express provision in the agreement, as adopted, entitling victims to participate. See
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S 1-41273 [here-
inafter Framework Agreement]. Similarly, while the Cambodian law implementing
the agreement and establishing the ECCC references a right of victims to appeal
against decisions of the ECCC Trial Chamber, it does not otherwise expressly permit
victims to participate in ECCC proceedings. Law on the Establishment of the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Republic of Kampuchea, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27,
2004) [hereinafter ECCC Establishment Law].
17. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12(3) (expanding the mandate of the
ECCC's Victim Support Section ("VSS") to include "the development and imple-
mentation of non-judicial programs and measures addressing the broader interests of
2012] VICTIM PARTICIPATION 303
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participation in these programs might enable women to tell their stories
unfettered by the limitations inherent in criminal proceedings. At the
same time, because these programs were created by the ICC and ECCC,
they remain connected to the work of those courts, meaning they may
have stronger moral condemnation power than mechanisms, such as
truth commissions, which operate independently of the criminal justice
process. Although these programs are currently underfunded and un-
derdeveloped, I suggest that they are worth exploring, as they hold out
the possibility of complementing the inevitably limited narratives which
emerge through criminal proceedings and bringing us closer to making
the more complex and subtle narratives of women's experiences "fully
visible."
I. "THE TASK OF SEEING WOMEN:"" VISIBILITY
AS A FEMINIST GOAL
Feminist scholars have long highlighted the underrepresentation, if
not complete absence, of women's experiences or perspectives in the
construction and implementation of international law." This critique
has been applied to a number of areas of international law,20 including
international criminal law. Critics have highlighted, for instance, that
despite the widespread use of rape and other forms of sexual violence
during World War II, the term "rape" is completely absent from the
179-page judgment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) creat-
ed after World War II to try the most senior civilian and military leaders
of Nazi Germany.2 1 Moreover, while rape was prosecuted by the Interna-
victims"); ICC TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, LEARNING FROM THE TFV's SECOND
MANDATE: FROM IMPLEMENTING REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE TO REPARATIONS,
4 (2011), http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/imce/TFV%20
Programme%20Report%2OFall%202010.pdf (characterizing the TFV's second
mandate as "providing victims and their families with physical rehabilitation, material
support, and/or psychological rehabilitation where the ICC has jurisdiction").
18. This phrase is taken from Doris Buss's article entitled The Curious Visibility of War-
time Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law. See Buss, supra note
9, at 4.
19. See generally CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 3; Chinkin, Wright & Charlesworth, supra note 11; see also Fionnuala Ni
Aoliin, Exploring a Feminist Theory of Harm in the Context of Conflicted and Post-
Conflict Societies, 35 QUEEN'S L.J. 219, 220 (2009) ("Feminist scholars have long
identified the limited capacity of law to fully capture the experiences of women.").
20. See generally Chinkin, Wright & Charlesworth, supra note 11.
21. Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing The International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 Hum. RTs. Q. 649, 664 (1995). Note, how-
ever, that evidence of rape was introduced during the trial. Id. at 662-64.
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tional Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), established after the
war to try Japanese leaders, that tribunal failed to bring charges against
any of the accused for the rapes and sexual slavery committed against an
estimated 200,000 women detained by the Japanese military across the
Asia-Pacific region in the 1930s and 1940s. 22
Despite the limited recognition of sexual violence by the post-war
International Military Tribunals, the wartime experiences of women
have gained increasing visibility since the 1990s. Indeed, feminist activ-
ism helped ensure that wartime rape and other abuses against women in
situations of mass violence were successfully prosecuted as serious inter-
national crimes by the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals.23 As a result,
wartime sexual violence against women has become, as one scholar
notes, "clearly visible and established as an issue of concern in the
. .. . .,,24
emerging international criminal apparatus.
Nevertheless, feminist activists and others began to question how
much of women's experiences were actually being captured by the inter-
. . 25
national criminal apparatus. For instance, inconsistent investigation
and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence resulted, in some
cases, in the absence of these offenses from the proceedings altogether,
even where credible evidence of such violence was available. 26 A stark
example of this occurred in the Cyangugu case,27 tried by the ICTR. In
that case, two prosecution witnesses spontaneously testified during the
trial about uncharged acts of sexual violence.28 The Coalition for Women's
22. Chinkin, Wright & Charlesworth, Feminist Approacbes, supra note 11, at 26. Signifi-
cantly, no victims of rape were called to testify at either the IMT or the IMTFE.
Nicola Henry, Witness to Rape: The Limits and Potential of International War Crimes
Trials for Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence, 3 INT'L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 114,
115 (2009).
23. Buss, supra note 9, at 4.
24. Buss, supra note 9, at 4.
25. Buss, supra note 9, at 4-5.
26. See, e.g., Rwanda's Rape Victims, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that at the ICTR "[s]ome
cases have moved forward without rape charges, sometimes even when the prosecutor
is in possession of strong evidence [of such crimes]").
27. See Prosecutor v. Andrd Imanishimwe, Emmanuel Bagambiki & Samuel Ntagerura,
Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Cyangugu case].
28. See Brief for Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations as Ami-
cus Curiae Respecting the Need to Include Sexual Violence Charges in the
Indictment at § II(A), Prosecutor v. Imanishime, Bagambiki & Ntagerura, Case
No. ICTR 99-46-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 1, 2001), http://www.
womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/Cyangugu/amicusBrief.php
[hereinafter Coalition's Cyangugu Amicus Brief].
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Human Rights in Conflict Situations (Coalition)2 9 moved to be heard as
amicus curiae, urging the Tribunal to request that the prosecution con-
sider amending the indictment against the accusedo to include sexual
violence charges." The prosecution opposed the motion, however, argu-
ing that charging decisions were a matter of prosecutorial discretion32
and indicating its intention to file a new indictment with rape allega-
tions at a later date." Ultimately, the Trial Chamber not only denied the
Coalition's motion," but also excluded evidence of the uncharged crimes
of sexual violence, suggesting in dicta that permitting such evidence
might result in unfair prejudice to the accused." Notably, the prosecu-
tion failed to file the promised new indictment. As a result, victims of
sexual violence were silenced and their experiences excluded from the
record.
A similar process of exclusion occurred in the case against the Civil
Defense Forces (CDF)," a pro-government militia that fought during
Sierra Leone's eleven-year civil war.3 7 The case was tried by the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, a "hybrid" court set up by agreement between
29. See COALITION FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS, http://
www.womensrightscoalition.Org/site/main en.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2011)
(describing the Coalition goals as "promot[ing] the adequate prosecution of perpetra-
tors of crimes of gender violence in transitional justice systems based in Africa, in
order to create precedents that recognise violence against women in conflict situations
[and] help[ing] find ways to obtain justice for women survivors of sexual violence").
30. Although the accused were originally indicted in two separate cases, the case against
Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe was eventually joined with the case
against Andr6 Ntagerura. See Prosecutor v. Andr6 Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-96-10-
I, Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Bagambiki & Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR 97-
36-I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Joinder, 1 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Oct. 11, 1999).
31. Coalition's Cyangugu Amicus Brief, supra note 28, § I(B).
32. See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T,
Decision on the Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief According to Rule 74 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Filed on Behalf of the NGO Coalition for
Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations, 1 9 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
May 24, 2001), http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/
rwanda/Cyangugu/decisionMay2001.pdf.
33. See id 10.
34. See id. T 20.
35. See id. 23 ("Although no additional rule of law need be invoked to support the
Chamber's decision, additional buttress may be found in a well settled common law
principle which, for the sake of forestalling the possibility of prejudice [to the defend-
ant], forbids the prosecution from leading evidence on a crime that is not charged in
the indictment at issue.").
36. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T.
37. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Indictment,
1 4, 6 (Feb. 4, 2004).
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the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to prosecute
atrocities committed in Sierra Leone during its civil war." There, the
prosecution omitted any allegations with respect to sexual or gender-
based violence in its initial indictment against the three leaders of the
CDE3  While subsequent investigations led the prosecution to seek to
amend the indictment to add charges based on evidence regarding the
subjection of women and girls to various forms of sexual violence, the
Trial Chamber refused to allow the amendment.40 In its decision, the
Chamber noted it was "pre-eminently conscious of the importance that
gender crimes occupy in international criminal justice given the very
high casualty rates of females in sexual and other brutal gender-related
abuses during internal and international conflicts." It held, however,
that adding the new charges would result in undue delay and would
prejudice the rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial." The
prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of sexual violence to
support the charges of inhumane acts as a crime against humanity
and/or violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being of per-
sons as a war crime, both of which had been included in the original
indictment." Yet the Trial Chamber rejected the request, reasoning that
the indictment did not allege any facts relating to sexual violence in
support of the relevant charges and that permitting the evidence
would cause undue prejudice to the accused.44 As a result, evidence of
sexual violence was completely excluded from the case. Indeed, even
though seven women took the stand to testify about acts of violence,
the Chamber did not permit any of them to speak about the acts of
sexual or gender-based violence they had endured, which arguably con-
stituted "the principal manner in which they were victimized during the
38. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
39. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Indict-
ment, 11 22-29 (describing multiple charges against Norman, Fofana, and
Kondewa, but none relating to sexual or gender-based violence).
40. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision
on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, T 86-87 (May 20,
2004).
41. Id. 118 2.
42. See id. 1 86 (stating that the prosecution did not provide sufficient evidence).
43. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned
Majority Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the Admissibility of Evi-
dence, 1 3 (May 24, 2005) (noting the prosecution's argument that the ad hoc tri-
tribunals have routinely recognized acts of sexual violence as constituting crimes
against humanity and/or war crimes when committed in the relevant context).
44. See id. 1 19 (delineating a separate category of sexual offenses under Article 2(g) that
the accused must have been charged with to allege acts of sexual violence).
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Sierra Leonean conflict.""5 As two researchers who interviewed the wit-
nesses noted, the "ruling . . . had a kind of ripple effect whereby wider
and wider circles of the women's experience had to be eliminated from
their testimony.""
Even in cases in which the tribunals have prosecuted sexual vio-
lence, many victims' voices were either not heard or only partially heard.
Although numbers do not tell the whole story, it is noteworthy, for in-
stance, that despite the prosecution of rape as a war crime and crime
against humanity by the ICTY,47 only about 18 percent of the 3,700
witnesses who appeared before that tribunal from 1996 to 2006 were
female." Similarly, although more than half of the indictments issued by
the ICTR between 1995 and 2002 included counts of sexual violence,
"only 1/6 of the witness statements taken by the investigation teams
concerned acts of sexual violence."49
Moreover, of the limited number of victims who did play a role in
prosecuting sexual violence at these tribunals, many were often repeated-
ly interrupted and unable to tell their story on their own terms.o The
following excerpt from the Oelibidi case5 tried by the ICTY is illustra-
tive:
Q. Mrs Cecez, during the ten minutes that you were being
raped, what were you doing during that time?
A. I could not do anything. I was lying there and he was rap-
ing me. There was-I had no way of defending myself. I
couldn't understand what was going on, what was hap-
pening to me.
Q. Were you crying, Mrs Cecez?
45. Kendall & Staggs, supra note 8, at 356.
46. Kendall & Staggs, supra note 8, at 364.
47. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
48. Henry, supra note 22, at 120 (citing Wendy Lobwein, Experiences of Victims and
Witnesses Section at the ICTY, in LARGE-SCALE VICTIMISATION AS A POTENTIONAL
SOURCE OF TERRORIST ACTIVTIES: IMPORTANCE OF REGAINING SECURITY IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES (Uwe Ewald and Ksenija Turkovid eds., 2006)).
49. Gadle Breton-Le Goff, Analysis of Trends in Sexual Violence Prosecutions in Indict-
ments by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) From November
1995 to November 2002: A Study of the McGill Doctoral Affiliates Working Group
on International Justice, Rwanda Section (Nov. 28, 2002), http://www.
womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwandalrapeVictimssDeniedJusticel
analysisoftrends en.php.
50. Henry, supra note 22, at 126-27; Julie Mertus, Shouting from the Bottom of the Well:
The Impact of International Trials for Wartime Rape on Women's Agency, 6 INT' FEM-
INIST J. POL. 110, 115-16 (2004).
51. Celebidi Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4.
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A. Yes, yes, I was, of course. I was crying. I said: "My God,
what have I come to live through?" He said: "It is all be-
cause of [your husband] Lazar. You wouldn't be here if he
were around," but I was completely beside myself. To
trample a woman's pride like that. I come from a good
family. It was a large clan. That is the fate....
Q. I want to stop you. Let me just clarify: when you were in
the room, you were in the room by yourself and then this
person Sok came; is that correct? Was there just the two of
you in the room?52
Clearly, the focus of the prosecutor was on the facts necessary to se-
cure a conviction for the rape rather than on letting the witness tell her
story. Likewise, in the Foca case," which focused exclusively on the rape,
torture, and mistreatment of women during the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, witnesses were "compelled to narrowly define what hap-
pened to them in line with the rules of evidence and the legal definition
of rape."
Victims of sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide who testi-
fied before the ICTR experienced similar restrictions on their testimony.
As one commentator who interviewed numerous rape survivors, includ-
ing six rape victims who testified before the ICTR, noted, "Rwandan
women express[ed] deep concern that the ICTR is not fully and proper-
ly prosecuting the crimes that occurred against them: that the court is
not acknowledging their pain, not telling their story, not enshrining
their experience of the genocide.""
Perhaps the limitations faced by victims of sexual and gender-based
violence in the context of international criminal tribunals is not surpris-
ing given the nature of these criminal trials. Based primarily on the
adversarial model, 6 neither the Special Court for Sierra Leone nor the
52. Prosecutor v. Delalid et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Transcript at 494-95 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Celebidi Transcript].
53. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
54. Mertus, supra note 50, at 116. See also Franke, supra note 9, at 818 ("Forced to testi-
fy to their experiences by answering prosecutors' questions in a 'yes' or 'no' manner,
and interrupted by the judges when their testimony veered beyond the immediate
question of the culpability of the individual defendant, many victims of sexual vio-
lence who have testified before the ICTY have found their experiences as witnesses
humiliating and disrespectful.").
55. Rwanda's Rape Victims, supra note 8, at 5.
56. See David Hunt, The UN International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Inter-
national Justice: TheJudges and Their Role, Europe and the Balkans, Occasional Paper
No. 18, at 2 ("To a large extent, by making the Prosecutor responsible for the inves-
tigation and prosecution of the accused, the Statute [of the ICTY] had adopted the
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ad hoc tribunals were designed as truth-telling mechanisms. Rather, they
were established to assess the guilt or innocence of accused for particular
crimes17 that the prosecution decides to pursue." Witnesses are called to
prove or disprove elements of the crimes with which the accused are
charged. Thus, victims' stories are limited by the evidentiary needs of
the party calling the victim as a witness. 9 As a result, story-telling is of-
ten "fragmented and frequently interrupted."'o
Admittedly, the inability of victims to tell their stories because of the
tribunal's refusal to charge the crimes they suffered, or because of the
truncated nature of witness testimony in adversarial systems, is not unique
to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Nevertheless, in light of
the historical silence surrounding sexual and gender-based crimes in situa-
common law adversarial system in preference to the civil law inquisitorial system, and
this fact is reflected in the Rules which were adopted."). The same is true of the stat-
ute of the ICTR. See also SCSL Statute, supra note 38, art. 15(2) (providing that the
Prosecutor will "have the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect
evidence and to conduct on-site investigations").
57. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Respon-
sible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/25704, at 36 (May 25, 1993) ("The International Tribunal shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with
the provisions of the present Statute.").
58. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 15(1),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) ("The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda . . .").
59. See Emily Haslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Tri-
umph of Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUEs 320 (Dominic McGoldrick et al., eds. 2004);
Marie-Banadicte Dembour & Emily Haslam, Silencing Hearings?, Victim- Witnesses at
War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151, 154 (2004) ("In the judicial arena ...
story-telling can only take the form of giving legal evidence. It is constrained by the
judicial endeavor to establish a legally authoritative account of 'what happened.'").
Dembour and Haslam note, for instance, that in Prosecutor v. Krsti6, where 18 vic-
tim-witnesses testified about the role Radislav Krstidhad in the forcible displacement
of women, children and elderly from the Bosnian town of Srebrnica and the subse-
quent execution of about 8000 men and boys, the "Tribunal frequently interrupt[ed]
victim-witnesses when their narratives [became] irrelevant to the purpose of assessing
the guilt of the accused." Id. at 158.
60. Henry, supra note 22, at 125. See also Jonathan Doak, Victims' Rights in Criminal
Trials: Prospects for Participation, 32 J.L. & Soc'Y 294, 298 (2005) ("[Victim-
witnesses'] testimony must be shaped to bring out its maximum adversarial effect,
and witnesses are thereby confined to answering questions within the parameters set
down by the questioner. The victim is denied the opportunity to relay his or her own
narrative to the court using his or her own words . . . .").
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tions of conflict, mass violence, or repression,6' a significantly limited pic-
ture of women's experiences remains even after the jurisprudential gains
made by international criminal tribunals in this area. Indeed, feminist
scholars have highlighted a number of ways in which the visibility of
womens experiences remains superficial at best.6 2
First, the focus of the prosecution, particularly at the ad hoc tribu-
63
nals, has tended to be largely on sexual violations. Yet, women often
experience gendered violence in the context of conflict or mass violence
that is not sexual. For instance, when widowed or forced to flee their
homes because of conflict, women often face more severe economic
hardship than men. This is because in many societies, discriminatory
laws or policies mean that women have little or no access to credit, land,
capital, or other services.6 Moreover, there is evidence that violence
against women by members of their own family and community esca-
lates during periods of conflict or unrest." As one commentator has
noted, the discrimination and violence women face under "normal cir-
cumstances" makes their "experience of harm more acute and their
capacity to recover much more limited.",6 Indeed, a number of psycho-
logical studies indicate that women's experience of trauma suffered as a
result of conflict differs significantly from that of men.6 ' For instance,
one study which focused on traumatized women asylum-seekers, refu-
gees, and war and torture victims "demonstrated that the incidence of
PTSD in women was twice as high as in men, and that women tended
to exhibit a more chronic course of PTSD over their lifetimes."'6 Never-
theless, these types of harms are rarely surfaced in the proceedings before
international criminal tribunals. With some notable exceptions, the
61. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
63. See Ni Aoldin, supra note 19, at 239-41; Catherine O'Rourke, The Shifing Signifier
of "Community" in Transitional Justice: A Feminist Analysis, 23 Wis. J.L. GENDER &
Soc'y 269, 284-85 (2008); see also Franke, supra note 9, at 822-23.
64. See JUDITH G. GARDAM & MICHELLE J. JARVIs, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 41 (2001).
65. Id. at 30.
66. Ni Aolin, supra note 19, at 230-31.
67. Nf Aoldin, supra note 19, at 228-29.
68. Ni Aolfin, supra note 19, at 228. For a discussion of other examples of the gender-
differentiated impact of conflict, see GARDAM & JARVIS, supra note 64, at 19-5 1.
69. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., Case No. SCLS-2004-16-A,
Appeals Judgment, T 195, 202 (Feb. 22, 2008) (finding that forced marriage con-
stitutes the crime against humanity of "other inhumane acts" and distinguishing it
from the crime against humanity of sexual slavery on the grounds that: "[w]hile forced
marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as nonconsensual sex and dep-
rivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing factors"). The Appeals Chamber went on
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tribunals have concentrated on a narrow range of sexual acts, resulting
in the "essentialization of women's experiences of injury"70 during peri-
ods of conflict. As one survivor explains it, the near-exclusive focus on
sexual violence has had an identity-reducing effect: "it hurts because you
are branded a raped woman and it becomes your only identity."" More-
over, as one feminist scholar notes, the "narrow focus on bodily
violation can obscure the wider social context in which the abuse oc-
curs,"72 making less visible the socioeconomic and other violations
women routinely experience as direct harms in situations of conflict or
repression.
Second, proving the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc
and hybrid criminal tribunals requires that the prosecution show that
the offense occurred in the context of an armed conflict,7 3 an attack
against a civilian population," or the targeting of a particular group for
destruction." Sexual violence prosecutions by these tribunals have there-
fore often characterized the harm experienced by the victim-witness as
part of a broader struggle against a rival community. As a result, "the
mass rape of women becomes visible only within the narrow ... con-
strained framework of [a] . . . conflict between two [groups]."7 Seen this
way, the "sexual violence may be visible ... [but] gender inequality is
not, and nor are the other systemic variables that produced a situation in
which the mass sexual violence of women was made possible in the first
place."77 For instance, in Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi,
former mayor of Rusumo in Eastern Rwanda, was tried for his role in,
among other things, sexual violence against Tutsi women in the Rusumo
to explain "[flirst, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person by force
or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated
with him, into a forced conjugal association with a [sic] another person resulting in great
suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike
sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the 'hus-
band' and 'wife,' which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this
exclusive arrangement. These distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predomi-
nantly a sexual crime. The Trial Chamber, therefore, erred in holding that the
evidence of forced marriage is subsumed in the elements of sexual slavery." Id.,
1 195.
70. Ni Aoldin, supra note 19, at 232-33.
71. Henry, supra note 22, at 131 (quoting 35 mm film: CALLING THE GHosTs: A STORY
ABOUT RAPE, WAR AND WOMEN (New York: Women Make Movies 1996)).
72. Nf Aoldin, supra note 19, at 240.
73. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8.
74. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7.
75. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 6.
76. Buss, supra note 9, at 15.
77. Buss, supra note 9, at 15.
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commune. Witness TAS, a Hutu woman married to a Tutsi man, testi-
fied that she had been raped by a Hutu attacker.7 ' Given the context of
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where those identified as Hutu over-
whelmingly attacked those perceived as Tutsi, the Tribunal characterized
the rape as an attack on the Tutsi civilians in this way: "through the
woman, it was her husband, a Tutsi civilian, who was the target. Thus,
the rape was part of the widespread attacks against Tutsi civilians . . .""
What gets lost in the Tribunal's analysis, as one feminist scholar notes, is
that Witness TAS was the direct victim of the crime and, more im-
portantly, that certain gendered dynamics that predated the genocide
enabled the conditions for the genocide and resulting mass sexual vio-
lence." As this scholar explains:
In the sexual economy that accompanied ethnic stratification
in Rwanda, Tutsi women, at least symbolically, were idolized
and highly sexualized. Having a Tutsi mistress or secretary was
seen as a sign of social capital for Hutu men. In the propagan-
da accompanying the build up to and conduct of the
genocide, Tutsi women's sexuality was central . . . And yet,
there is very little space in [the Gacumbitsi] and other deci-
sions to accommodate a consideration of the sexual economy
that facilitated and marked the genocide.82
The result of emphasizing, above all else, the connection between
the victim and the ethnic context of the conflict is that "other forms of
oppression, in this case gender, are maneuvered out of the frame of
analysis."" What remains in the record is, thus, only a superficial por-
trait of women's experience.
Because international criminal prosecutions have resutted in lim-
ited visibility of the full spectrum of harms women face in situations of
conflict and repression, some feminist scholars have questioned what,
after all, can be achieved through the international criminal apparatus.
The question this Article poses is whether the new victim participation
schemes at the ICC and ECCC, which give victims unprecedented
rights to participate in the proceedings, have allowed survivors of
78. Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, 198
(June 17, 2004).
79. Id. 209.
80. Id. 222.
81. Buss, supra note 9, at 16.
82. Buss, supra note 9, at 16-17.
83. Buss, supra note 9, at 17.
84. Buss, supra note 9, at 22.
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sexual and gender-based violence to communicate a more complex
and comprehensive picture of their experiences than they were able to
in the context of the ad hoc tribunals or the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. Have they, in fact, helped us in the "task of seeing women?"
II. VICTIM PARTICIPATION
The idea that victims should be allowed to participate in interna-
tional criminal proceedings stems from a broader movement over the
last several decades advocating for restorative-as opposed to merely
retributive-justice." Proponents of this restorative justice movement
maintain that "'justice should not only address traditional retributive
justice, i.e., punishment of the guilty, but should also provide a measure
of restorative justice by, inter alia, allowing victims to participate in the
proceedings and by providing compensation to victims for their inju-
ries.'""6 In other words, advocates of this movement believe that
85. See, e.g., War Crimes Research Office, VICTIM PARTICIPATION BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 8 (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter WCRO 2007 Victim
Participation Report] (citing Haslam, supra n. 59, at 315) (noting that the Rome
Statute marked a "major departure from a hitherto limited theory of international
criminal justice, which is centered on punishment and international order," towards a
"more expansive model of international criminal law that encompasses social welfare
and restorative justice"); Gilbert Bitti & Hikan Friman, Participation of Victims in the
Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 456, 457 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) ("The model
for victims' participation thus developed in the [Rome] Statute was seen as an im-
portant achievement because the Court's role should not purely be punitive but also
restorative."). See also WOMEN'S CAUCUS FOR GENDER JUSTICE, Recommendations
and Commentary for the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 20
(June 12-30, 2000) http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraftl/Archives/oldWCGJ/
aboutcaucus.htm, [hereinafter WCGJ 2000 PrepCom Recommendations] ("The
codification of victim participation in article 68(3) in the Rome statute reflects the
fact that many court systems around the world have successfully allowed victims to
participate in criminal trials . . . This reflects a growing recognition that justice re-
quires more than putting someone in jail."). Note that, as mentioned supra note 16,
this discussion is largely focused on the history of victim participation in relation to
the ICC, as the role of victim participants in proceedings before the ECCC was not
explicitly discussed during the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the agree-
ment between Cambodia and the United Nations which set up the basic framework
for the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders. For further discussion of the genesis of
victim participation in the context of the ICC, see Susana SiCouto & Katherine
Cleary, Victims' Participation in the Investigations of the International Criminal Court,
17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 73, 76-88 (2008).
86. See Judges' Report, Victims Compensation and Participation, CC/P.I.S./528-E, at 1,
Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia (Sept. 13, 2000), http://www.un.org/
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criminal justice mechanisms should serve the interests of victims in ad-
dition to punishing wrongdoers, and that the participation of victims in
criminal proceedings is an integral part of serving victims' interests.
Although the concept of victim participation in criminal proceed-
ings is not easily defined, it has been described as victims "being in
control, having a say, being listened to, or being treated with dignity and
respect.", 7 Women's rights activists supported the concept for several
reasons. Many believed, as did victim advocates more generally," that
participation in criminal proceedings has a number of potential restora-
tive benefits, including the promotion of victims' "healing and
rehabilitation."' 9 Indeed, in its recommendations to the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(PrepCom 1),9o the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (WCGJ)-a net-
work of women's rights activists and organizations dedicated to advocating
for the incorporation of "gender perspectives in the ongoing process
icty/pressreal/tolb-e.htm, cited in WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra
note 85, at 8. As discussed in the WCRO Report, the term "restorative justice" is a
broad term used in a variety of contexts, including as a way to describe programs de-
signed to facilitate victim-offender mediation outside the traditional criminal justice
realm. However, the use of the term here is limited to the movement within the
criminal justice context that advocates the position that criminal justice mechanisms
should serve the interests of victims, as opposed to strictly punishing perpetrators of
crimes.
87. Doak, supra note 60, at 295 (citing Ian Edwards, An Ambiguous Participant: The
Crime Victim and Criminal justice Decision-Making, 44 BIur. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY
967, 973 (2004)). See also MiKAELA HEIKKII, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
AND VICTIMS OF CRIME: A STUDY OF THE STATUS OF VICTIMs BEFORE INTERNATION-
AL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND OF FACTORS AFFECTING THIS STATUS 141-42 (2004)
("For the healing process of victims, it is ... important that they have a sense of con-
trol over how their case is being dealt with, but also, more generally, that they are
treated with dignity and respect.").
88. See WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, 8-9 (citing Fiona
McKay, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Criminal Prosecutions in Europe Since
1990 for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Torture and Genocide, REDRESS,
June 30, 1999 at 15, http://www.redress.org/documents/inpract.html; Victims'
Rights Working Group, Victims' Rights in the International Criminal Court, at 4,
http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/0 1 VRWG%20flyer2000.pdf ("The possibility af-
forded to victims to contribute to fact-finding and truth-telling in the judicial process
before the ICC may contribute to their healing after victimization and trauma.")).
89. See WOMEN'S CAUCUS FOR GENDER JUSTICE, Recommendations and Commentary for
August 1997PrepCom on the Establishment ofan International Criminal Court, United
Nations Headquarters 33 (Aug. 4-15, 1997) [hereinafter WCGJ 1997 PrepCom
Recommendations].
90. The Preparatory Committee was the successor to the ad hoc Committee set up in
1995 to discuss a draft statute for the creation of an international criminal court.
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of setting up the International Criminal Court"9 -argued that
"[p]articipation is significant not only to protecting the rights of the
victim at various stages of the proceeding, but also to advancing the
process of healing from trauma and degradation." 92 Relatedly, some
believed that victim participation would bring the Court "closer to the
persons who have suffered atrocities"3 and, thus, increase the likelihood
that victims would be satisfied that justice was done.9' As the Women's
Caucus for Gender Justice noted in a later set of recommendations on
the ICC Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
"[t]he right of victims to participate in the proceedings was included in
the Rome Statute to ensure that the process is as respectful and transpar-
ent as possible so that justice can be seen to be done. . . ." Finally, and
significantly for the purpose of this analysis, women's rights activists
thought that victim participation might help address the under- or mis-
representation of the experiences of women. As the WCGJ explained
in its recommendations to PrepCom I:
The active involvement, enhanced respect and protection af-
forded by participation and representation is particularly
significant for victims of sexual and gender violence whose
91. See WOMEN'S CAUCUS FOR GENDER JUSTICE, http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraftl/
Archives/oldWCGJ/aboutcaucus.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
92. WCGJ 1997 PrepCom Recommendations, supra note 89, at 33.
93. WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, at 9 (citing Bitti & Fri-
man, supra note 85, at 457).
94. WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, at 9 (citing WCGJ 2000
PrepCom Recommendations, supra note 85, at 20; Victims' Rights Working Group,
Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: Summary of Issues and
Recommendations, Nov. 2003, at 2, http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/01/VRWG
nov2003.pdf ("Taking into account the perspectives of victims will help to ensure
that victims have a positive relationship with the Court, and that the processes will
neither retraumatise them nor undermine their dignity.")).
95. WCGJ 2000 PrepCom Recommendations, supra note 85, at 20.
96. See, e.g., Court Must Fill Gender Gap in International Law, Insists Women's Caucus, in
1 ICC ON THE RECORD, Iss. 2 (June 16, 1998) (noting argument by the Women's
Caucus for Gender Justice that the ICC must "'have the capacity the ensure that
crimes against women are not ignored or treated as trivial or secondary,'" "'take ac-
count of the disproportionate or distinct impact of the core crimes (e.g. genocide,
crimes against humanity) on women,'" and "'be equipped and enabled to eliminate
common assumptions about and prejudices against women and their experiences,'" in
part by ensuring that the Court is empowered to afford women survivors the "'neces-
sary protection and participation'" in proceedings).
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perceptions and needs are-in all cultures of the world-
frequently ignored, presumed, or misunderstood."
Not surprisingly, perhaps, advocates of victim participation had
high expectations that this new scheme would allow victims to tell their
story in a way they were unable to do as victim-witnesses before the Yu-
goslav and Rwanda tribunals.18
A. Victim Participation at the ICC
As ultimately adopted, the victim participation scheme at the ICC,
reflected primarily in Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, establishes a
general right of victims whose personal interests are affected to present
their "views and concerns" to the ICC and have them "considered" by
the Court at appropriate stages of the proceedings." Significantly, this
right is separate from the right of victims to seek reparations.0 Indeed,
under the Rome Statute, victims are not required to participate in pre-trial
or trial proceedings before the ICC in order to make a claim for
reparations, and victims may participate in proceedings without pursuing
reparations.'1 Thus, unlike victim participation in many domestic
97. WCGJ 1997 PrepCom Recommendations, supra note 89, at 33.
98. See, e.g., Haslam, supra note 59, at 320 (noting that "[i]t was the failure of [the Yugo-
slav and Rwanda] Tribunals to take the interests of victims sufficiently into account
that motivated many NGOs, individuals and some governments to argue for a new
approach that would safeguard the interests of victims at the ICC" and that this ap-
proach represented "an attempt to avoid the problems that victims encountered when
they testified before the ad hoc War Crimes Tribunals"); David Donat-Cattin, Article
68: Protection of Victims and Witnesses and their Participation in the Proceedings, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
869, 871 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) ("[T]he inclusion of norms on victims' partici-
pation in the Court's proceedings . . . was the result of widespread and strong
criticism against the lack of provisions of this kind in the Statutes and Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence of the ad hoc Tribunals."); Vahida Nainar, Giving Victims a
Voice in the International Criminal Court, UN CHRON., Issue 4 (1999), http://
www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft l/Archives/oldWCGJ/resources/unchronicle.htm (not-
ing that in designing rules to implement the victim participation scheme at the ICC,
the "[e]xperiences of victims of the ad-hoc Tribunals must be taken into account and
the shortcoming of the existing systems must be rectified for future").
99. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 68(3).
100. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 75 (allowing the Court to issue an order "spec-
ifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims" without any indication
that such victims must have participated in proceedings pursuant to Article 68(3) of
the Statute).
101. See, e.g., Booklet, Victims Before the International Criminal Court: A Guide for
the Participation of Victims in the Proceedings of the Court, http://www.
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criminal systems-the primary purpose of which is to join a victim's
claim for civil damages with a criminal acton -victim participation
at the ICC was envisioned as something more than a means by which
. 103
victims could seek reparations.
In addition to the general Article 68(3) framework for victim par-
ticipation, the Rome Statute includes two provisions granting victims
the explicit right to participate in proceedings at the investigation stage
of the ICC's work, that is, even before particular suspects or crimes are
identified by the prosecution.'o' The first relates to the Prosecutor's pow-
icc-cpi.int/library/victims/VPRSBooklet En.pdf (describing the different roles of
victims before the ICC and distinguishing between participation and seeking an order
of reparations from the Court); La Fddration Internationale des Droits
de l'Homme, Victims' Rights Before the International Criminal Court: A Guide for
Victims, their Legal Representatives and NGOs, Apr. 23, 2007, Chap. IV, p. 5, http://
www.fidh.orglarticle.php3?id-article=4208 ("It is important to note that the proce-
dure for requesting reparations is an independent procedure. Victims do not have to
participate in pre-trial or trial proceedings in order to make a claim for repara-
tions."(emphasis in original)).
102. See Judges' Report, Victims Compensation and Participation, CC/P.I.S./528-E, at 6,
Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia (Sept. 13, 2000), http://www.un.org/
icty/pressreal/tolb-e.htm ("[M]ost legal systems based on civil law allow for the par-
ticipation of a victim as a partie civil; this procedure allows a victim to participate in
criminal proceedings as a civil complainant and to claim damage from an accused.");
Doak, supra note 60, at 310-11 (explaining that, under the partie civile systems
commonplace in countries such as France and Belgium and the "adhesion" procedure
used in Germany, the "ability to pursue civil damages in the criminal trial should, in
theory, improve speed, cost, and time involved given that both civil and criminal is-
sues are resolved in the same forum"). In fact, according to Doak, participation by
victims within the French system "tends to be limited to the pursuit of the civil claim
[for damages]." Doak, supra note 60, at 311.
103. Carsten Stahn, Hictor Olisolo & Kate Gibson, Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial
Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 219, 219-220 (2006) (noting that the
Rome Statute marks "a significant departure from the mere conceptualization of vic-
tim's rights in terms of reparation").
104. In the context of the ICC, the Court's operations are divided into two broad categories:
"situations" and "cases." According to Pre-Trial Chamber I, "situations" are "generally
defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases personal parameters" and "en-
tail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine whether a particular situation
should give rise to a criminal investigation as well as the investigation as such." Situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, No. ICC-01/04-tEN-Corr, 165, [Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4,
VPRS 5 and VPRS 6] (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2006). In other words, the
"situation" refers to the operations of the ICC within a given country that are not di-
rected at a particular suspect identified by the Prosecutor as having allegedly
committed particular crimes. By contrast, "cases" are defined as "specific incidents
during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court seem to have
been committed by one or more identified suspects" and entail "proceedings that take
place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear." Id.
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ers under Article 15 of the Statute to "initiate investigations proprio mo-
tu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court,"105 which may include information received from victims."o" Spe-
cifically, Article 15(3) provides:
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation [proprio motu], he or she shall
submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of
an investigation, together with any supporting material col-
lected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial
Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence.107
The second provision granting victims the right of participation at
the investigation phase is Article 19(3) of the Rome Statute, which
authorizes victims to "submit observations to the Court"'o0 regarding
105. Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 15(1). See also id. at art. 15(2) ("The Prosecutor
shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or she
may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, intergov-
ernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she
deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the
Court.").
106. See WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, at 20 (citing M.
Bergsmo & J. Pejic, On Article 15, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 364-69 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999)) (arguing that,
although there is no express right of victims to submit information to the Prosecutor,
the drafters "clearly contemplated that the Prosecutor could receive information from
victims pursuant to Article 15, paragraphs 1 and 2"); Allison Marston Danner, En-
hancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 516 (2003) ("[T]he Prosecutor
may himself trigger the ICC's jurisdiction by commencing an investigation on the ba-
sis of information he has received; the source of the information is irrelevant. It is
widely assumed that NGOs and victims' groups will provide this kind of information
to the Prosecutor.").
107. Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 15(3) (emphasis added).
108. Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 19(3) ("In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction
or admissibility, those who have referred the situation under article 13, as wellas vic-
tims, may also submit observations to the Court.") (emphasis added). Note that
Article 15(3) refers to "representations" by victims, while Article 19 refers to "obser-
vations." The Statute does not define either term or distinguish one from the other.
However, Rule 50 (providing the procedure for Article 15) and Rule 59 (providing the
procedure for Article 19) both speak of a victim's right to provide "representations" and
both require such representations to be submitted in writing. Compare International
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/I/3 (2002), R. 50(3)
[hereinafter ICC Rules] with ICC Rules, R. 59(3). This may indicate that although
these articles use different terminology, they both contemplate only written submis-
sions on behalf of victims at these early stages of the proceedings.
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challenges to the admissibility or jurisdiction of a case brought under
that article. 09
Nevertheless, even under the ICC scheme, there are significant lim-
itations on the participation of victims. As a general matter, the Rome
Statute and the ICC's procedural rules require that Court proceedings
be conducted in a manner that is expeditious and fair."o Indeed, while a
desire to serve the interests of victims was crucial to the founding of the
ICC,"' the drafters of the Rome Statute also "considered [it] necessary
to devise a realistic system that would give satisfaction to those who had
suffered harm without jeopardizing the ability of the Court to proceed
109. The first two sub-parts of Article 19 provide as follows:
1. The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought
before it. The Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility
of a case in accordance with article 17.
2. Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in ar-
ticle 17 or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by:
(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons
to appear has been issued under article 58;
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is in-
vestigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted; or
(c) A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under arti-
cle 12.
Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 19(1)-(2). In addition, under Rule 93 of the
Court's procedural rules, a Chamber "may seek the views of victims or their legal
representatives participating pursuant to rules 89 to 91 on any issue . . . In addition, a
Chamber may seek the views of other victims, as appropriate." ICC Rules, supra note
108, at R. 93.
110. For example, Article 64 of the Rome Statute reflects a clear concern for Court effi-
ciency by generally requiring Trial Chambers to ensure that proceedings be
conducted in "a manner that is fair and expeditious." See Rome Statute, supra note 7,
at arts. 64(2), 64(3)(a). See also ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 101 ("In making any
order setting time limits regarding the conduct of any proceedings, the Court shall
have regard to the need to facilitate fair and expeditious proceedings, bearing in mind
in particular the rights of the defence and the victims."). Article 67 covers the rights
of the accused, which include the right to a fair hearing conducted impartially, to be
informed of the charges against him or her, to have adequate time and facilities to
prepare a defence with counsel of the accused's choosing, and to be tried without
"undue delay." Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 67(1).
111. See, e.g., Theo van Boven, The Position of the Victim in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 77
(Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999) ("The suffering and the plight of victims
undoubtedly contributed to the motivation of all the persons and institutions who
advocated the establishment of an effective International Criminal Court (ICC) as a
reaction against widespread patterns and practices of impunity for the perpetrators of
the most serious international crimes.").
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against those who had committed the crimes."' Moreover, the drafters
of the Rome Statute were concerned with the potential effects that vic-
tim participation could have on the rights of the accused.'" As Judge
Claude Jorda, former President of the ICTY and former Pre-Trial Judge
at the ICC, explained in the context of the ad hoc criminal tribunals in
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda:
It is true that to authorize a victim to intervene in the proceed-
ings in his personal capacity, with a view to expressing his
concerns and obtaining reparation, is not in itself inconsistent,
in formal terms, with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. However, having regard to the nature and
scope of the crimes over which the ad hoc Tribunals possess ju-
risdiction, such a prerogative may undermine the rights of the
accused if it is not strictly defined and meticulously orga-
nized.' 14
Thus, perhaps the most significant limitation on victims' right to
participate in proceedings before the ICC appears in the wording of
Article 68(3) itself, which reflects the drafters' concerns regarding fair-
ness and expeditiousness. Article 68(3) provides that victims' views
and concerns will be presented and considered "at stages of the pro-
ceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner
which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused
112. WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, at 26 (citing Silvia A. Fer-
naindez de Gurmendi, Definition of Victims and General Principle, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE 427, 429 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001)). See also Stahn, et al., Participation
of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings ofthe ICC, supra note 103, at 223 (noting that "an
extensive interpretation of victims' rights could conflict with two cardinal principles
which are vital to the work and functioning of the Court: the function of the Court
as a judicial institution, and the imperative of impartiality").
113. See, e.g., Bitti & Friman, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, supra note 85, at
457 ("[M]any delegations were concerned that the potential numbers of victims
might make their participation practically impossible and, thus, the modalities for ex-
ercising their right to participate in a given case were left in the hands of the Court.
Since the practices and experiences regarding victims' participation are different in
different legal traditions, some delegations were also uncertain what impact such an
individual role would have on the rights of the accused.").
114. WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, at 27-28 (citing Claude
Jorda & J&6me de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in 2 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1388,
1393 (Cassese et al. eds., 2002)).
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and a fair and impartial trial.""' This limitation is also reflected in the
ICC's procedural rules, which establish the basic procedure by which
victims apply to participate under Article 68(3)."' For instance, Rule 89
provides that it is the Chamber that shall "specify the proceedings and
manner in which participation is considered appropriate, which may
include making opening and closing statements."'
Moreover, a number of other procedural rules constrain both when
and how victims can participate. For instance, Rule 89(1) provides that
copies of victims' applications to participate in proceedings shall be
made available to both the prosecution and defense counsel, who have
the opportunity to comment on the applications."' Under Rule 89(2),
either the prosecution or defense may request that the Court deny an
application to participate on the grounds that the applicant is not a "vic-
tim" under Rule 85,"' or otherwise does not fulfill the criteria of Article
68(3). 120
Even if victims are granted participation rights by the Court, the
scope of their participation is not infinite, as victim participants do not
115. Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 68(3). See also Bitti & Friman, Participation of
Victims in the Proceedings, supra note 85, at 457 (noting that "[i]n order to overcome
(potential efficiency and fairness] concerns, [Article 68(3)] states that victims' partici-
pation shall take place 'in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial'").
116. See generally ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 89-91.
117. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 89(1).
118. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 89(1) ("Subject to the provisions of the Statute, in
particular article 68, paragraph 1, the Registrar shall provide a copy of the application
to the Prosecutor and the defence, who shall be entitled to reply within a time limit
to be set by the Chamber."). Applicants may request that the Court redact their
name and other information likely to reveal the applicants' identity prior to transmit-
ting an application to the Defence. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 68(1)
("The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psy-
chological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the
Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender as defined in arti-
cle 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not
limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against
children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investiga-
tion and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.").
119. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 85.
120. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 89(2) ("The Chamber, on its own initiative or on
the application of the Prosecutor or the defence, may reject the application if it con-
siders that the person is not a victim or that the criteria set forth in article 68,
paragraph 3, are not otherwise fulfilled. A victim whose application has been rejected
may file a new application later in the proceedings.").
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become parties to the proceedings.' For example, victims' representa-
tives must apply simply to obtain leave from the Court to examine
witnesses, experts, and the accused, and furthermore, representatives
may be restricted to making written-as opposed to oral-
interventions.12  Moreover, to the extent that victims are permitted to
make submissions, the prosecution and defense are entitled to file re-
plies." Additionally, unlike victim participants in some civil law systems,
victim participants in the ICC context do not have the express right to
initiate an investigation, or to compel the Prosecutor to pursue any par-
ticular suspect or crime.124 Significantly, the rules provide that it is the
legal representative-and not the victim-that has a right to attend and
participate in the proceedings of the Court. 25 1Finally, although victims
121. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Cham-
ber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Modalities of Victim
Participation at Trial," '1 47-48 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Katanga
and Ngudjolo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga] (noting that, unlike parties,
"victims do not have the right to present evidence during the trial; the possibility of
victims being requested to submit evidence is contingent on them fulfilling numerous
conditions") (emphasis added). See also Jorda & de Hemptinne, The Status and Role
ofthe Victim, supra note 114, at 1405 ("a victim does not become a true party to the
trial"); Karen Corrie, Victims' Participation and Defendants' Due Process Rights: Com-
patible Regimes at the International Criminal Court, AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION COALITION FOR THE ICC, Jan. 10, 2007, at 17-18, http://
www.amicc.org/docs/Corrie%20Victims.pdf ("Unlike those domestic judicial systems
in which participating victims actually become third parties to the case, victims before
the ICC do not gain the status of fully participating third parties at any phase of the
investigation or proceedings."). Accord Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, ICC-01/04-556, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage
of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, 1 55 [hereinafter
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on Victim Participa-
tion] (noting that "[p]articipation pursuant to article 68(3) ... does not equate
victims, as the case law of the Appeals Chamber conclusively establishes, to parties to
the proceedings before a Chamber. . . .").
122. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 91. See also Corrie, supra note 121, at 7 (noting that
these provisions "help to protect the integrity of the Prosecutor's case and the rights
of the accused").
123. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 91(2).
124. WCRO 2007 Victim Participation Report, supra note 85, at 32 (citing Bitti & Fri-
man, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, supra note 85, at 457 n. 67 (noting
that, "[c]ontrary to what is the case in, for example, French and Swedish municipal
systems, victims do not have the right under the Rome Statute to initiate the criminal
proceedings")).
125. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 91(2) ("A legal representative of the victim shall be
entitled to attend and participate in the proceedings ....
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are entitled to choose their own legal representative, the Court "may, for
the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings, request the
victims or particular groups of victims . . . to choose a common legal
. . ,,126.
representative or representatives or appoint a common legal repre-
,, - a> 127
sentative if the victims are "unable to choose one.
Thus, while Article 68(3) establishes a general right of victims to
participate in ICC proceedings, concerns regarding the efficiency of the
process and the rights of the accused resulted in a number of significant
restrictions on the modalities and scope of victims' participation in pro-
ceedings before the ICC.
B. Victim Participation at the ECCC
Nearly a decade after the victim participation scheme was estab-
lished at the ICC, a similar scheme was set up to allow victims to
participate in the proceedings before the ECCC. Notably, neither the
agreement between Cambodia and the United Nations on the frame-
work of the ECCCl2 8 nor the Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers (ECCC Establishment Law)'29 explicitly pro-
vide for a right of victims to participate in proceedings. However, the
ECCC Establishment Law requires the ECCC to conduct proceedings
in accordance with Cambodia's existing criminal procedures,' which at
the time the Establishment Law was passed included a mechanism by
which victims of the crime being prosecuted could participate in the
d. . . .131proceedings as civil parties.
126. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 90(2).
127. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 90(3).
128. See Framework Agreement, supra note 16.
129. See ECCC Establishment Law, supra note 16.
130. ECCC Establishment Law, supra note 16, at art. 33 (providing in part that trials be
"conducted in accordance with existing procedures in force"). This is consistent with
the 2003 agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia that sets out the framework of the ECCC, which states that ECCC proce-
dure "shall be in accordance with Cambodian law." Framework Agreement, supra
note 16, at art. 12(1).
131. At the time, there were two Cambodian procedural codes to which the ECCC could
have referred: the 1992 Transitional Law adopted by the United Nations Transition-
al Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC Law) and the 1993 Law on Criminal Procedure
(SOC Law). See Provisions Dated September 10, 1992 Relating to the Judiciary and
Criminal Law and Procedure Applicable in Cambodia During the Transitional Peri-
od (Sept. 10, 1992), www.eu-asac.org/programme/arms law/UNTAC%20Law.pdf;
Law on Criminal Procedure (Mar. 8, 1993) (Cambodia), http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=181004 [hereinafter SOC Law]. Since then, a new Code
of Criminal Procedure was passed, which similarly provides that victims have a right
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Thus, the Chamber's Internal Rules, drafted by the ECCC's judges
in 2007, permit victims to exercise a right to take "civil action" during
the criminal proceedings, 132 giving civil parties a right to be "heard" by
the Chambers. Nevertheless, as in the context of the ICC, victim par-
ticipation at the ECCC is not without limits. Indeed, although one
might expect that as "parties" to the proceedings, civil parties at the
ECCC would have more extensive rights than victim participants at the
ICC, the ECCC's Internal Rules-as well as ECCC jurisprudence,
which will be discussed more fully below-indicate that this is not nec-
essarily the case.
For instance, while one of the purposes articulated in the Rules for
a "civil party action" is to allow victims to participate in the proceedings,
the Rules add that victims who participate must do so "by supporting
the prosecution." 35 Thus, victims' requests or interventions must be
made, if not in support of the prosecution's case, then with the prosecu-
tion's consent. For example, if a civil party uncovers new evidence not
alleged in the prosecution's submissions to the investigating chamber-
which, at the ECCC, is the organ responsible for investigating the
case'_-after the prosecution's preliminary investigation into potential
crimes, suspects, and witnesses,13 1 the new evidence cannot be investigated
unless the prosecution submits a supplementary submission to the investi-
gating chamber requesting it to pursue that evidence.' As in the ICC
context, civil parties at the ECCC do not have a right to initiate an inves-
tigation without the prosecutions consent, or to compel the Prosecutor to
to participate in criminal proceedings as civil parties. Mark E. Wojcik, False Hope:
Rights of Victims Before International Criminal Tribunals, 28 L'OBSERVATEUR DES
NATIONs UNIES, 11 (2010).
132. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23.
133. See, e.g., ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 91(1) ("The Chamber shall hear
the Civil Parties . . .") (emphasis added).
134. See Charline Yim, The Scope of Victim Participation Before the ICC and the ECCC,
SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH (Documentation Center of Cambodia, Jan. 2011).
135. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23(1)(b). The other purpose listed in the
Rules for a civil party action is so that victims "may seek collective and moral repara-
tions." ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23(1)(a). This is similar to the
rationale for civil party participation in many civil law systems, namely to allow vic-
tims to consolidate their claim for damages with the criminal action. See supra note
102 and accompanying text.
136. The ECCC has an investigating chamber modeled on the French civil law system. See
ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 14, R. 55.
137. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 15, R. 50.
138. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 55(3).
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pursue any particular suspect or crime.'" Therefore, victim participation
at the ECCC is similarly constrained by the decisions of the prosecu-
tion.
Victim participation at the ECCC is further procedurally limited
by the decision-making power of the Chambers. For instance, as men-
tioned earlier, although civil parties have a right to be "heard" by the
Chambers,o victims' representatives must apply for leave from the
Chambers in order to examine witnesses, as in the ICC."' Additionally,
the Chamber is empowered to determine the order in which victims'
representatives will be heard'42 and any questions civil parties want to
ask themselves-as opposed to through their representatives-must be
asked "through the President of the Chamber.""'
Furthermore, victims are encouraged to form groups to present
their interests in a collective manner before the ECCC, thereby limiting
the ability of victim participants to make their individual experiences
heard." If victims do not form groups on their own, the investigating
chamber may group them or assign them to existing groups and desig-
nate a common lawyer to represent the group(s). More significantly,
although victims can participate in proceedings directly or through their
own representatives at the pre-trial stage, ECCC judges recently
changed the Rules to require that, at the trial stage and beyond, not only
must civil parties be represented by civil party lawyers,'"4 but they also
must comprise a "single, consolidated group, whose interests are repre-
sented by the Civil Party Co-Lead Lawyers."' 7 Thus, it is the Civil Party
Co-Lead Lawyers-and not the civil parties or their individual legal rep-
resentatives-that are "responsible . . . for the overall advocacy, strategy,
and in-court presentation of the interests of the . . . Civil Parties during
the trial stage and beyond." 48 Notably, the Civil Party Co-Lead Lawyers
139. Notably, civil parties can also appeal a verdict handed down by the Trial Chambers,
but only when the prosecution has also appealed. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra
note 13, at R. 105(c).
140. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 91(1) ("The Chamber shall hear the Civil
Parties . . .") (emphasis added).
141. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 91(2).
142. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 9 1(1).
143. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 91(2).
144. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23ter(3), 23quater.
145. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23ter(3). A group of victims can also or-
ganize as members of a Victims Association and be represented by the Association's
lawyers. See id. at R. 23quarter.
146. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23ter(1).
147. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23(3). The role of the Civil Party Lead
Co-Lawyers is described in Rule 12ter.
148. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12ter(5)(b).
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must discharge these obligations "whilst balancing the rights of all par-
ties and the need for an expeditious trial. . . .""'Therefore, while the
Civil Party Co-Lead Lawyers must "seek the views" of civil party repre-
sentatives and "endeavor to reach consensus in order to coordinate
representation of Civil Parties at trial,"O they must ultimately organize
civil party interventions so as not to undermine the fairness and expedi-
tiousness of the trial. The result of these new rules is that the ability of
individual civil parties to communicate with the Chambers, even
through their own legal representative, is significantly restricted, particu-
larly in cases with large numbers of victims.
In sum, while the ECCC Internal Rules establish a right of victims
to participate in ECCC proceedings as civil parties, they also limit vic-
tim participation in ways similar to the restrictions imposed on victims
at the ICC.
III. EXPERIENCE OF VICTIM PARTICIPANTS
BEFORE THE ICC AND ECCC
Have these new participation schemes before the ICC and ECCC,
in fact, helped us in the "task of seeing women"?151 What impact have
they had on the ability of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence
to tell their story and to talk about their experiences in their own words?
In particular, has victim participation enabled more of them to tell their
stories than would have been possible under the more traditional adver-
sarial model employed by the ad hoc tribunals and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone? Has it allowed them to expand the historical record pro-
duced by these tribunals with narratives that would otherwise have been
left out because of prosecutorial or judicial decisions not to prosecute
violations committed against them? Has it enabled victims of sexual and
gender-based violence to communicate a richer, more nuanced picture
of their experiences than they were able to in the context of prior tribu-
nals?
149. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12ter(1). See also ECCC Internal Rules,
supra note 13, at R. 12ter(2) (noting that Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers are "obliged
to promote justice and the fair and effective conduct of proceedings").
150. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12ter(3).
151. As noted earlier, this phrase is taken from Doris Buss's article entitled The Curious
Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law. See
Buss, supra note 9, at 4.
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A. The Promise of Victim Participation Before the ICC and ECCC
The early history of victim participation at the ICC and ECCC in-
dicates considerable interest by victims in making use of their new
participation rights. At the ICC, for example, from 2005 until the end
of March 2011, 4,773 victims had applied to participate in either one of
the five situations then before the Court-the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, or
Kenya-or one of the cases arising out of those situations. 15 2 Of those
applicants, 2,317, or nearly 50 percent, had been authorized to partici-
pate.5 3 Interestingly, the largest number of applicants was authorized to
participate in the case against Jean-Pierre Bemba, a case arising out of
the CAR situation and the only one focused almost exclusively on
crimes of sexual violence.154 As of March 31, 2011, 1,366 victim appli-
152. ICC Registry Facts and Figures, at 4 (Apr. 8, 2011), http://212.159.242.181/
NR/rdonlyres/9B984A20-08A9-4127-87F9-2FDF7A4FOE53/283201 /RegistryFacts
andFiguresEN2.pdf. Note that these figures do not include applicants in the case
against Callixte Mbarushimana (arising out of the DRC situation) or the two cases
against six individuals arising out of the Kenya situation, the charges against whom
had yet to be confirmed as of the date of this writing. See Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Prosecution's request for
the postponement of the confirmation hearing, 11 (May 31, 2011) (postponing the
commencement of the confirmation hearing to 17 August 2011); Prosecutor v. Wil-
liam Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-
01/09-01/11, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ Situations+and+Cases/Situations/
Situation+ICC+0109/Related+Cases/ICC01090111/ICCO1090111.htm (noting date
of confirmation hearing as Sept. 1, 2011); Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura,
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-0 1/09-02/11,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC
+0109/Related+Cases/ICC01090211/ICC01090111.htm (noting date of confirma-
tion hearing as Sept. 21, 2011).
153. ICC Registry Facts and Figures, supra note 152, at 4.
154. See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Deci-
sion Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June
2009). Bemba was a former vice president in the DRC and the leader of the Move-
ment for Liberation of Congo (MLC) rebel group, but he is charged with crimes
allegedly committed in the CAR. Id. See also Kelly Askin, International Criminal
Court Takes on Gender Crimes, OPEN SOCIETY BLOG (Nov. 23, 2010), http://
blog. soros.org/2010/11/international-criminal-court-takes-on-gender-crimes/ (not-
ing while murder and pillage are also charged, the Bemba case is "first and foremost a
rape crimes trial"). While the case against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo,
currently before the ICC's trial chamber II, does include significant rape and sexual
slavery charges, "the gender crimes in that case are incorporated as part of an array of
crimes-including conscripting child soldiers, murders and attacks against the civilian
population, and property crimes-they are not front and center as with Bemba." Id.
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cations had been granted in Bemba.'" Comparatively, only 122 persons
had been granted victim status in the case against Thomas Dyilo
Lubanga;"' 366 in the joint case against Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo;17 and 89 in the joint case against Abdallah Banda Abakaer
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus,'" the only other cases cur-
rently at trial before the ICC. The high number of participants in the
only case focused almost exclusively on sexual violence-as opposed to
cases where sexual violence was either not charged or included as one of
several other crimes-indicates a high demand for participation by vic-
tims of sexual and gender-based violence. Indeed, although the Court
does not regularly provide figures on the gender breakdown of victim
participants, according to figures provided by the ICC's Victim Partici-
pation and Reparation Sections ("VPRS"), as of September 2010,
approximately one-third of all victims admitted to participate in pro-
ceedings before the Court were women. 5
Significantly, a number of additional victims of sexual and gen-
der-based violence made representations to the ICC in connection
with the prosecutor's proprio motu investigation of the situation in
Kenya under Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute, 16 further demonstrat-
ing the demand for participation by victims of such crimes. Of the
396 victims who made such representations,"' 237 requested that the
155. ICC Registry Facts and Figures, supra note 152, at 4. Note that the number of victim
participants had increased to a total of 1620 as of July 8, 2011, and that more are ex-
pected given the Trial Chamber's decision to extend the deadline for victim
participation applications to September 16, 2011. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on 401 applications by victims to
participate in the proceedings and setting a final deadline for the submission of new
victims' applications to the Registry, I 38(h) (July 9, 2011).
156. ICC Registry Facts and Figures, supra note 152, at 4.
157. ICC Registry Facts and Figures, supra note 152, at 4. Both the Lubanga case and the
joint case against Katanga and Ngudjolo arose out of the DRC situation.
158. ICC Registry Facts and Figures, supra note 152, at 4. The joint case against Banda
and Jerbo arose out of the situation in Darfur, Sudan.
159. See Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, Gender Report Card on the International
Criminal Court 2010, 191 (Nov. 2010), http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/
GRC1O-WEB-l1-10-v4_Final-version-Dec.pdf [hereinafter WIG] 2010 Gender Re-
port Card (noting figures were based on information provided by the VPRS by email
to the WIGJ dated 2 September 2010). See also Women's Initiatives for Gender Jus-
tice, Legal Eye on the ICC, Mar. 2011, http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/
LegalEyeMarl 1 /index.html. Interestingly, however, none of the victim participants
admitted in the case against president of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al'Bashir, as of
the same date, had been women, despite the fact that the charges against him include
sexual violence charges. See WIG] 2010 Gender Report Card, supra note 159, at 204.
160. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
161. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, No. ICC-01/09, Public Redacted Version Of Cor-
rigendum to the Report on Victims' Representations (ICC-01/09-17-Conf-Exp-Corr)
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investigation include incidents of sexual violence. 162 Moreover, of the
victims who made individual representations, 40 percent were
163
women.
At the ECCC, a total of 90 victims applied to participate as civil
parties in the first case prosecuted by that tribunal, the case against
Kaing Guek Eay, also known as "Duch."'6 Duch was found guilty of
crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions in connection with his role as the commander of the detention
and torture center known as S-21 during the Khmer Rouge period.16 1 In
contrast, nearly 4,000 victims applied for civil party status in the second
case before the ECCC, a joint case against the four most senior living
members of the Khmer Rouge regime.t6 Of those, 3,850 were granted
the right to participate in the case. 1 Notably, of the total number of
applicants in these two cases, 61 percent were women.6
and annexes I and 5, 1J 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Situation in the Republic
of Kenya, Report on Victims' Representations].
162. Id. 110 (Mar. 29, 2010). See aso id. 112 ("176 of the individual representations
and 61 of the collective representations mention an act of sexual violence.").
163. Id. 41 (Mar. 29, 2010).
164. ECCC Victim Support Section, Victims Participation: Presentation on VSS e&r LCL
(Nov. 8, 2010) (on file with author). Although in the final judgment against Duch,
the Trial Chamber ultimately decided that 24 of these civil parties had not produced
sufficient evidence to support their claims and, thus, denied them civil party status,
they were conditionally admitted, and thus participated, as civil parties during the tri-
al. See Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/
ECCCITC, JudgmentJuly 26, 2010) [hereinafter Duch Trial Judgment].
165. See Duch Trial Judgment, supra note 164.
166. Co-Investigating Judges Issue Closing Order in Case 002, PRESs RELEASE (ECCC)
Sept. 16, 2010 (indicating the court had received 3988 civil party applications). The
four Khmer Rouge leaders are: 1) leng Sary, Khmer Rouge deputy prime minister for
foreign affairs; 2) Nuon Chea, second in command under Khmer Rouge leader Pol
Pot; 3) Khieu Samphan, Khmer Rouge head of state; and 4) leng Thirith, Khmer
Rouge minister of social affairs. See Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al., 002/19-09-
2007/ECCC-PTC, Case Information Sheets, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/
case002.aspx. The case is referred to by the ECCC as Case 002. As of May 18, 2011,
the Court had also received 318 civil parry applications in a third case, known as Case
003. Statement from the Co-Investigating Judges, PRESs RELEASE (ECCC) May 30,
2011. However, thus far, no persons have been charged in the case. A fourth case,
Case 004, is also under investigation by the ECCC but, again, thus far, no persons
have officially been charged in that case.
167. Pre-Trial Chamber Overturns Previous Rejection of 98% of Appealing Civil Party
Applicants in Case 002, PRESs RELEASE (ECCC) June 24, 2011 (noting decision by
Pre-Trial Chamber reversing previous denial of 1,728 civil party applications, bring-
ing total number of civil parties in the case to 3,850).
168. Victims Participation: Presentation on VSS & LCL (ECCC Victim Support Section)
Nov. 8, 2010 (on file with author).
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These applicant numbers indicate not only strong interest by vic-
tims in making use of their new participation rights but also that a
significant percentage of that interest has come from either women or
victims of sexual or gender-based violence. When compared to the rela-
tively small number of female witnesses who testified before the ICTY
from 1996 to 2006 and the low percentage of witness statements fo-
cused on sexual violence at the ICTR from 1995-2002,"9 the numbers
alone suggest that these schemes may, in fact, enable more survivors of
sexual and gender-based violence to tell their stories than would have
been possible at the ad hoc tribunals or the SCSL.
Moreover, a review of the initial cases tried by these tribunals indi-
cates that, for some victims, these schemes have made a real difference.
Through their participation, they have been able to communicate a sig-
nificant aspect of their story to the court in a way that likely would not
have been possible at the other tribunals.
Most significantly, in the first case to come before the ICC, against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo-a Congolese militia leader charged with war
crimes relating to the enlistment, conscription, and use of children un-
der the age of fifteen in armed conflicto-the Trial Chamber affirmed
the unique role victim participants have in proceedings before the Court
by allowing three victims to address the Court directly, without being
called as witnesses by either the prosecutor or the defense.' 7 ' There, the
three victim participants had requested to speak to the court about, inter
alia, "their individual histories, within the context of the charges faced
by the accused" and "the harm they individually experienced." 2
Although Article 68(3) does not explicitly mention the right of victims
to address the Court in person, and Rule 91(2) expressly refers to the
right of victims' legal representatives-rather than of victims-to attend
and participate in proceedings, 7 1 the Chamber noted that Article 68(3)
"establishes the unequivocal statutory right for victims to present their
169. See Kendall & Staggs, supra note 8, at 46-47 (noting only about 18 percent of the
3,700 witnesses who appeared before the ICTY from 1996 to 2006 were female and
that although more than half of the indictments issued by the ICTR between 1995
and 2002 included counts of sexual violence, "only 1/6 of the witness statements tak-
en by the investigation teams concerned acts of sexual violence").
170. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 1319 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
exeres/0814EEBO-8251-47A3-AB41-3Fl49BADBI87.htm.
171. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Request by Victims a/0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to Express Their Views
and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence during the Trial, 11 17, 40 (June
26, 2009) [hereinafter Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims].
172. Id. 1 15.
173. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 91(2).
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views and concerns in person when their personal interests are affect-
e .. ,,174ed...."
Moreover, the Trial Chamber held that apart from "expressing their
views and concerns," victims had a right, under certain conditions, to
"give evidence,"" explaining that this right stemmed from the general
right of the Court, pursuant to Article 69(3) of the Statute, "'to request
the presentation of all evidence necessary for the determination of the
truth.' ,176 While the Prosecutor argued that the testimony of at least two
of the victims would "merely duplicate evidence that has already been
given," the Chamber dismissed the argument, emphasizing that "the
account of each [victim] is unique-none of their personal histories are
the same. ... "" In addition, the Chamber stressed that in any event,
the victims proposed to deal with issues not yet addressed in previous
testimony.'79 Eventually, all three victims-two former child soldiers and
a schoolmaster who tried to prevent the abduction of children-
addressed the Chamber directly. "0 Notably, the decision to allow victims
to address the Court directly was followed by the Trial Chamber in the
Katanga and Ngudjolo case.m'
174. Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note 171, 1J17 (emphasis add-
ed). Notably, the Chamber does not provide support for this contention other than
noting "'[b]y Article 68(3) of the Statute it is clear that victims have the right to par-
ticipate directly in the proceedings, since this provision provides that when the Court
considers it appropriate the views and concerns of victims may otherwise be presented
by a legal representative.'" Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note
171, 1 18 (quoting an earlier decision by the same Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01104-01/06, Decision on Victims' Partici-
pation, 9 115 (Jan. 18, 2008)).
175. Lubanga Decision on the Requst by Victims, supra note 171, 9191 19-20, 25.
176. Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note 171, 91 19 (citing Prosecu-
tor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Victims'
Participation, 91 108 (Jan. 18, 2008)). The right of victim participants to tender and
examine evidence was upheld by the Appeals Chamber. See Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals of The Pros-
ecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation
of 18 January 2008, 9T 3-4 (July 11, 2008).
177. Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note 171, 1 37.
178. Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note 171, 91 37.
179. Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note 171, I 37-38.
180. Although much of the testimony given by these three victims occurred in closed ses-
sion, part of their testimony can be read in the transcripts of the case. See generally
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcripts (Jan.
12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, and 26, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int (follow "Situations
and Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Case The Prosecu-
tor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo" hyperlink; then follow "Transcripts" hyperlink).
181. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Dicision aux fins de comparution des victimes a/03 8 1/09, a/0018/09,
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Secondly, although Lubanga was not charged with sexual or gen-
der-based crimes, four legal representatives of victims specifically
referred to sexual and gender-based violence suffered by girl soldiers
during their opening statements.182 As mentioned earlier, Lubanga was
charged with war crimes relating to the enlistment, conscription, and
use of children under the age of fifteen in armed conflict."' Despite
strong advocacy by women's rights groups and others, the prosecutor did
not specifically charge the accused with any sexual or gender-based
crimes.' Nevertheless, legal representatives of female child soldiers spoke
at length during their opening statements not only about the fact that girl
a/0191/08 et pan/0363/09 agissant au nom de a/0363/09 (Nov. 9, 2010), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc964978.pdf (allowing four victims who had not
been called by either party to address the Chamber).
182. See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Trial Finally Underway, LEGAL EYE ON
THE ICC, WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE (Mar. 2009), http://
www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/LegalEye MarO9/index.html#drc [hereinafter WIGJ
LEGAL EYE ON THE ICC (Mar. 2009)].
183. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
ICC-01/04-01/06, supra note 170, '1319.
184. See generally Joint Letter from Avocats Sans Frontiares et al. to the Chief Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court, D.R. Congo: ICC Charges Raise Concern (July
31, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/01/ congol3891 txt.htm.
We are disappointed that two years of investigation by your office in the
DRC has not yielded a broader range of charges against Mr. Lubanga ....
We believe that you, as the prosecutor, must send a clear signal to the vic-
tims in Ituri and the people of the DRC that those who perpetrate crimes
such as rape, torture and summary executions will be held to account.
Id.; see also ICC Prosecutor Leaves Unfinished Business in Ituri, DRC, PRESS STATE-
MENT (Redress) Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/REDRESS
press-release.onNgudjolo eng.pdf [hereinafter Press Statement, Redress] ("There is
resentment that Thomas Lubanga and the UPC militia ... are getting away too light-
ly. Arrested by the ICC in March 2006, Lubanga is said to be responsible for
widespread killings and countless incidents of sexual violence. Yet, Lubanga has only
been charged with recruiting and using child soldiers."); Statement by the Women's
Initiatives for Gender Justice on the Arrest of Germain Katanga, PRESS RELEASE
(Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice) Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.iccwomen.org/
news/docs/ Arrest of Katanga.pdf.
The lack of charges for sexual violence against Lubanga was seen by many
local DRC NGOs and ourselves to be a significant omission given the
availability of information, witnesses and documentation from multiple
sources including the United Nations and various human rights organiza-
tions showing the widespread commission of rape and other forms of
sexualized violence by the UPC militia group.
Id. As discussed below, victims also sought, unsuccessfully, to include charges of sex-
ual slavery and inhuman and/or cruel treatment after the Pre-Trial Chamber
confirmed charges against Lubanga for the war crimes of enlistment, conscription,
and use of child soldiers. See infa notes 200-206.
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soldiers had been subjected to various forms of sexual and gender-based
violence, but also about the broader context and the long-term effects of
such violence."' For instance, Carine Bapita, one of these legal repre-
sentatives, noted:
Rape was . . . an integral part of the daily life of girls recruited
and listed by [Lubanga's militia]. The reality in the DRC and
in Africa in general is that women and girls are second-class
citizens. They are subordinate to men and they are afforded far
few [sic] opportunities to study . .. many families living in ru-
ral areas prioritise [sic] sending boys to school at the cost of
girls.. . . Before the war there was already great discrimination
as regards [sic] schooling. The recruitment of child-of girl
soldiers has had very negative consequences on their lives.
They have been denied the right to a childhood, to be
schooled, a right to safety, a right to be protected, a right to
physical integrity, a right to reproductive health and sexual au-
186tonomy.
Similarly, victims who made representations to the ICC in connec-
tion with the prosecutor's proprio motu investigation of the situation in
Kenya under Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute187 were able to speak to
staff of the Court's VPRS about "issues ... not within the Chamber's
power to resolve or respond to,"' including various ways in which vic-
tims continued to suffer long after the post-December 2008 election
violence, the primary subject of the prosecutor's investigation in Ken-
ya. 8' Although such issues would likely not have come to the attention
of the court in the more traditional adversarial proceedings before the ad
hoc tribunals or the SCSL, the VPRS included them in its report to the
Pre-Trial Chamber because it was their "understanding that these issues
... are raised because this process has provided a rare opportunity for
185. WIGJ LEGAL EYE ON THE ICC (March 2009), supra note 182.
186. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript at
54-55 (Jan. 26, 2009).
187. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
188. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Report on Victims' Representations, supra note
161, T 115.
189. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Report on Victims' Representations, supra note
161, T 120 (quoting one victim as saying: "Many people were affected, just for vot-
ing and many families left without breadwinners and are suffering today. Victims
have lost their lives. Personally, I see no future for myself and Children. I hope our
Kenyan government would help us and compensate and we are tired and suffering
because of this government. Many women raped were infected with HIV aids virus").
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victims to speak frankly about their needs and wishes"'90 and "it was
clearly the wish of victims to have these messages conveyed to the
Chamber."..'
Likewise, at the ECCC, some of the victims participating as civil
parties in the Duch trial found that they were able to address issues other
than those strictly required to convict the accused for the crimes with
which he was charged. Particularly significant for some victims was the
ability to 'question Duch directly about, among other things, why he
had ordered their loved ones to be tortured or killed.'92 Indeed, for some
victims, the ability to learn about these details and to communicate their
story to the court, irrespective of whether either was necessary for the
successful prosecution of the accused, was quite meaningful.'93 This view
was echoed by a civil party lawyer, who noted in his closing that the
ECCC had already provided victims with a "most valuable reparation:"
an acknowledgement of their right to be present and to participate, and
of their solidarity.9
B. The Reality of Victim Participation: Significant
Limitations Remain
Unfortunately, neither the considerable number of participants
thus far nor the examples I just described tell the whole story of victim
190. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Report on Victims' Representations, supra note
161,1 115.
191. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Report on Victims' Representations, supra note
161, [ 116.
192. See Interview with Eric Stover, Berkeley Human Rights Center (Dec. 9, 2010). See
also, e.g., Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-
2007/ECCCITC, Transcript of Trial Day 60 at 55-57 (Aug. 18, 2009) (quoting
Hay Sophea, a civil party whose father, a soldier, was imprisoned at S-21, as saying:
"Who were the masterminders who actually took my father to 5-21? ... where did
my father die? . .. how can [you] ... really heal the wounds of the victims who lost
their loved ones?").
193. Stover, supra note 192. See, e.g., Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch,
Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Transcript of Trial Day 61 at 86 (Aug. 19,
2009) (quoting Mr. Seang Vandy, a civil party whose brother was imprisoned and
executed at S-21: "After participating in the proceedings before this Chamber on
many occasions my feeling has become better in the hope that justice is being found
for my brother . . . Brother Phan, I truly believed that you are here to listen to the
proceedings before this Chamber because this afternoon I prayed to you to come here
and to participate in the proceedings so that you can witness and hear and that I have
attempted to find the justice for the criminal act committed upon you. So may your
soul receive the peace and that you rest in peace.").
194. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No, 001/18-07-2007/
ECCC/TC, Transcript of Trial Day 73, at 80 (Nov. 23, 2009).
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participation before the ICC and ECCC. Indeed, a more comprehensive
examination of victims' experiences in the initial cases tried by these tri-
bunals indicates that although there is some reason for optimism,
victims' voices are still limited in a variety of significant ways at these
tribunals.
First, as a general matter, victims do not get an opportunity to par-
ticipate in proceedings unless the harm they experienced is linked to the
charges being prosecuted by the court against the accused. This re-
quirement has been explicitly stated in the rules and/or jurisprudence of
both the ICC"' and the ECCC."'
195. While Rule 85 of ICC Rules defines "victims" as, inter alia, "any natural persons who
have suffered harm as a result of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court," ICC
Rules, supra note 108 (emphasis added), in the context of an individual case against
the accused-as opposed to an investigation of a situation, see supra note 104-the
harm must be connected to the offense(s) alleged against the accused. See, e.g., Prose-
cutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on
the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision
on Victims's Participation of 18 January 2008, 2 (July 11, 2008); Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-579,
Public Redacted Version of the 'Decision on the 97 Applications for Participation at
the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case', 1 66-67 (June 10, 2008); Prosecutor v. Bahar
Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09-121, Decision on the 34
Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, 1 12-13 (Sept. 25,
2009). Although in the Lubanga case, legal representatives of female child soldiers
were able to speak about various forms of sexual and gender-based violence that their
clients suffered despite the absence of specific gender-based charges against the
accused, the harm at issue was arguably connected to the existing charges against the
accused in the sense that it arose in the context of either child recruitment or the use
of children in hostilities. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-107-ENG, Transcript at 11 (Jan. 26 2009) (quoting Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo as saying, "[l]et me address the particular issue of sexual violence in
the context of child recruitment and the fate of girl soldiers enlisted, conscripted, and
used in combat by Thomas Lubanga's militia").
196. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, R. 23 bis (1)(b) ("In order for Civil Party
action to be admissible, the Civil Party applicant shall . .. b) demonstrate as a direct
consequence of at least one of the crimes alleged against the Charged Person, that he
or she has in fact suffered physical, material or psychological injury upon which a
claim of collective and moral reparation might be based."). A recent decision by the
Pre-Trial Chamber in Case 002 adopted an expansive interpretation of the phrase
"crimes alleged against the Charged Person" to include crimes relating to policies "in
areas other than those chosen to be investigated [by the OCIJ]," reasoning that "[t]he
admission as a civil party in respect of mass atrocity crimes should . . . be seen in the
context of dealing with wide spread [sic] and systematic actions resulting from the
implementation of nation wide [sic] policies in respect of which the individual liabil-
ity alleged against each of the accused also takes collective dimensions due to
allegations for acting together as part of a joint criminal enterprise." See Co-
Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Decision
on Appeals Against Orders of the Co-Investigating Judges on the Admissibility of
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Second, the charges against the accused still depend on what the
prosecution chooses to pursue. Indeed, victims do not have the ability to
independently initiate an investigation at either the ICC or the ECCC.9 7
Victims also lack the ability to compel the prosecution to either pursue
particular charges or amend existing charges against the accused at both
the ICC and the ECCC."' Although victims have tried to challenge these
Civil Party Applications, 77-78 (June 24, 2011) [hereinafter Nuon Chea et al.,
Decision on Appeals Against Orders].
197. In relation to the ICC, see Rome Statute, supra note 7, Art. 53(1) ("The Prosecutor
shall ... initiate an investigation unless he or she determines there is no reasonable
basis to proceed under this Statute.") (emphasis added). See alo Situation in Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on Victim Participation, supra note 121,
1 58 (holding that victims do not have a general right to participate at the investiga-
tion stage of a situation). The ruling confirms that the role of victims during the
investigation stage is generally limited to the specific rights given to them in the
Rome Statute at that stage, and these do not include a right to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. See also Bitti & Friman,
Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, supra note 85, at 457 (noting that,
"[c]ontrary to what is the case in, for example, French and Swedish municipal sys-
tems, victims [at the ICC] do not have the right to initiate criminal proceedings"). In
relation to the ECCC, see ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 49(1)
("[p]rosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC may be initiated only
by the Co-Prosecutors, whether at their own discretion or on the basis of a com-
plaint."). See also Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC-OCIJ, Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current
Residents of Svay Rieng Province, IT 17-19 (Sept. 9, 2010) ("Under ECCC proce-
dure, contrary to Cambodian Criminal Procedure, an applicant cannot launch a
judicial investigation simply by being joined as a Civil Party: being limited to action
by way of intervention, he or she may only join ongoing proceedings through the ap-
plication, and not widen the investigation beyond the factual situations of which the
Co-Investigating Judges are seized by the Co-Prosecutors (in rem seisin).... The Civil
Party application is therefore limited in the sense that it may not allege new facts dur-
ing the judicial investigation without first receiving a Supplementary Submission
from the Co-Prosecutors. . . . Accordingly, in order for a Civil Party application to be
admissible, the applicant is required to demonstrate that his or her alleged harm re-
sults only from facts for which the judicial investigation has already been opened.").
Although on appeal, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that the Co-Investigating
Judges had erred when limiting civil parties to those who could show harm resulting
"from facts for which the judicial investigation has already been opened"-noting
that the correct standard was whether they could show a link between the harm suf-
fered and the crimes (rather than the facts) alleged-it affirmed the notion that "Civil
Parties may not, on their own, allege new facts for the purposes of the investigation."
Nuon Chea et al., Decision on Appeals Against Orders, supra note 196, 1 41-42.
198. See infra notes 124, 135-139 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Nuon Chea et al.,
Decision on Appeals Against Orders, supra note 196, 197 (noting that participation
of additional victims in Case 002 would "not have a direct effect on decisions that
would directly and adversely affect the position of the Accused, such as whether to
prosecute or not, they do not explicitly have a say in possible amendments to the
charges ... ").
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limitations, the rules and jurisprudence of the tribunals have made clear
that victims do not have the power to force the prosecution's hand.
For instance, in the Lubanga case before the ICC, women's rights
groups criticized the prosecution for failing to include sexual violence
charges in the indictment against Lubanga, despite evidence that girls
had been kidnapped into Lubanga's militia and often raped and/or kept
as sex slaves.'" After the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed charges against
Lubanga for the war crimes of enlistment, conscription, and use of child
soldiers, victims participating in the trial petitioned the court to include
charges of sexual slavery and inhuman and/or cruel treatment.200 At
hough the Trial Chamber initially ruled that additional facts and
circumstances not described in the original charging document could be
used to re-characterize the charges against the accused anytime during
trial,20 1 the decision was overturned by the Appeals Chamber,202 which
held that Regulation 55-the regulation that the Trial Chamber had
relied on to reach its conclusion-did not permit the Chamber to re-
characterize the charges based on facts and circumstances not already
included in the charging document. 203 As one commentator noted, the
Appeals Chamber decision made clear that Regulation 55 could "not be
used to circumvent the Prosecutor's charging document."204 Indeed, the
Lubanga case exposed a significant limit on the rights of victims partici-
pating in proceedings before the ICC:205 despite the intense
199. See supra note 184.
200. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Joint Application
of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the Procedure
under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter
Lubanga Joint Application].
201. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Giving
Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts
May be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations
of the Court, 9J 27-32 (July 14, 2009) (quoting Regulation 55(1)). Note that the
victims' lawyers had contended that the new charges could be substantiated based on
existing witness testimony and evidence. Lubanga Joint Application, supra note 200,
142.
202. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on
the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial
Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and partic-
ipants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court" (Dec. 8, 2009).
203. Id. T 100, 112.
204. Amy Senier, The ICC Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Legal Characterization of the
Facts in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 14 ASIL INSIGHT 1, at 5 (Jan. 8, 2010), http://
www.asil.org/insightsl00108.cfm.
205. Id. Significantly, the Trial Chamber rejected a subsequent request by the victims to
re-characterize the charges against the accused based on existing evidence, finding
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dissatisfaction that victims' rights groups felt with the limited scope of
the charges against Lubanga and the compelling case they made for in-
clusion of gender-based charges, the Court made clear that victims do
not have the express right to compel the Prosecutor to pursue a particu-
206lar crime.
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, at the ECCC, the Internal Rules
make clear that the "purpose of Civil Party action . . . is to . . . partici-
pate in proceedings . . . by supporting the prosecution."207 Thus, requests
or interventions made by victims208 must be made, at the very least, with
the prosecution's consent. 209 Notably, in Case 002 against the most sen-
ior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, victims were successful in moving
the court to expand its investigation to include incidences of forced
marriage. 2 10 However, the investigating chamber could not have expand-
ed the investigation without the prosecution's consent. As mentioned
that the charges of sexual slavery and inhuman and/or cruel treatment could only be
proved by reference to evidence not in the charging document. Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Legal Representatives'
Joint Submissions concerning the Appeals Chamber's Decision on 8 December 2009
on Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, '1 37-38 (Jan. 8, 2010).
206. It is worth noting that even if victims had petitioned the Court before it confirmed
the charges against the accused, it would still be up to the Prosecutor to decide
whether to add those charges. Indeed, Article 61(7) of the Statute makes clear that if
the Pre-Trial Chamber is convinced that the charges should be amended, it must sus-
pend the confirmation hearing and request that the Prosecutor consider amending
the charges. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 61(7). Thus, the Prosecutor retains
ultimate authority regarding whether to add the new charges.
207. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 23(1).
208. Note that the Internal Rules permit parties, including civil parties, to request that the
Co-Investigating Judges "make orders or undertake such investigative action as they
consider useful for the conduct of the investigation." ECCC Internal Rules, supra
note 13, at R. 55(10).
209. See, e.g., Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-
OCIJ, Decision on Appeal of Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties against Order Rejecting
Request to Interview Persons named in the Forced Marriage and Enforced Disap-
pearance Requests for Investigative Action, I 11 (July 21, 2010) (holding that "while
Civil Parties and Civil Party Applicants may request the [Co-Investigating Judges] to
make such orders or undertake such investigative action as they consider necessary for
the conduct of the investigation, the scope of the investigation is defined by the [Co-
Prosecutors'] Introductory and Supplementary Submissions" and that, as a result,
while civil parties can bring new facts to the attention of the Co-Investigating Judges
or the Co-Prosecutors, they "have no standing for requesting investigative actions of
such facts unless these are included by the Co-Prosecutors in a Supplementary Sub-
mission").
210. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Order
on Request for Investigative Action Concerning Forced Marriages and Forced Sexual
Relations (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Case 002 Order on Investigative Action Con-
cerning Forced Marriage].
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earlier, if a civil party uncovers new evidence not alleged in the prosecu-
tion's submissions to the investigating chamber after the prosecution's
preliminary investigation into potential crimes, the new evidence cannot
be investigated. The only exception to this is if the prosecution submits
a supplementary submission to the investigating chamber requesting it
to pursue the new evidence,21' which is what happened here.212
Therefore, as in the ICC context, civil parties at the ECCC do not have
a right to initiate an investigation, or to compel the prosecution to pur-
213
sue any particular suspect or crime.
Of course, what the prosecution chooses to pursue often depends
on factors unrelated to the wishes of the victims. Indeed, even at the
ICC and the ECCC, where victims have been acknowledged as an inte-
gral part of the process, the prosecutors routinely take into account
factors other than the interests of victims in deciding whether to pursue
certain charges. These factors include, among other things, the gravity
of the crimes; the strength and credibility of the evidence; whether the
accused can be apprehended and arrested; and the current workload and
resources of the court. 214 Thus, if the prosecution chooses to bring
charges unrelated to sexual and gender-based violence, victims' stories,
no matter how compelling, will likely not be heard.
Moreover, the fact that the primary purpose of these tribunals re-
mains to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused has meant that
many of the restrictions facing victim-witnesses at the ad hoc tribunals
and the SCSL also limit the way in which victims, as a practical matter,
have been able to participate at the ICC and ECCC. Thus, many vic-
tims' voices continue to be either not heard or only partially heard.
For instance, although victim participants have been allowed to
present their views and concerns to the ICC in person when their per-
211. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 55(3).
212. Case 002 Order on Investigative Action Concerning Forced Marriage, supra note
210, J[1-2.
213. Notably, civil parties can also appeal a verdict handed down by the Trial Chambers,
but only when the Co-Prosecutors have also appealed it. See ECCC Internal Rules,
supra note 13, at R. 105(1c).
214. See, e.g., Jar6me de Hemptinne & Francesco Rindi, Notes and Comments, ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber Allows Victims to Participate in the Investigation Phase of Proceedings, J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST., 342, 347-48 (Apr. 2006) ("Indeed, the Statute requires that the
investigation be carried out in an independent and objective manner, with equal care
given to incriminating and exonerating circumstances. . . . Furthermore, it should be
noted that, in conducting the investigations, the Prosecutor, in addition to the inter-
ests of victims, has to take into account several other factors (such as the gravity of the
crimes, complementarity and other interests, e.g. reconciliation, excessive workload of
the Court, etc.")). See also Henry, supra note 22, at 120.
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sonal interests are affected,215 the Court has emphasized that such
presentations must not be "prejudicial to, or inconsistent with, the
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 216 Indeed, considera-
tions affecting the fairness and expeditiousness of proceedings must be
taken into account, including, for instance, the number of victims want-
ing to communicate their views and concerns to the Court.217
Recognizing that the participation of a large number of victims could
negatively impact the fair trial rights of the accused, the Court has
stressed that victims' common views might best be expressed through a
1 . 218common legal representative.
Notably, despite the fact that eight legal representatives were al-
lowed to attend and participate in the proceedings on behalf of those
granted victim status in the Lubanga case,219 in the Katanga and
Ngudjolo case, the Trial Chamber considered it necessary to divide par-
ticipating victims, who numbered 366 by the end of March 2011,220
into just two groups. The first consisted of former child soldiers alleged to
have participated in attacks against other victims, and the second consisted
of all other victims. The Court assigned each group a common legal repre-
sentative.221 Citing, inter alia, the Court's duty to ensure that "the
proceedings are conducted efficiently and with the appropriate celerity" 222
215. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
216. See Lubanga Decision on the Request of Victims, supra note 171, '1 17. Similarly, in
a decision issued in July 2010, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that victims do not
have a general "right to present evidence during the trial;" rather, "the possibility of
victims being requested to submit evidence is contingent on . . . numerous condi-
tions," including that victims' participation in this manner is consistent with the Trial
Chamber's obligation to "'ensure that [the] trial is fair and expeditious and is con-
ducted with full respect for the rights of the so accused.'" Prosecutor v. Katanga and
Ngudjolo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga, supra note 121, 1 48 (citing Ar-
ticle 64(2) of the Rome Statute).
217. Lubanga Decision on the Request of Victims, supra note 171, 18 (citing Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Victims' Partic-
ipation, 116 (Jan. 18, 2008)).
218. Lubanga Decision on the Request of Victims, supra note 171, I 18.
219. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript at
36-37 (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc623638.pdf (Victim
Representative Ms. Bapita listing order of opening statements to be given by seven le-
gal representatives and noting absence of eighth representative). See also BRIANNE
McGONIGLE LEYH, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE? VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 327 (2011). As of March 31, 2011, 122 victims had been
granted victim status in the Lubanga case. See supra note 152.
220. See supra note 157.
221. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07-579, Order on the Organisation of Common Legal Representation of Victims,
13 (July 22, 2009).
222. Id. [ 10.
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and that "victims' participation is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial,"223 the Chamber
concluded that "although victims are free to choose a legal representative,
this right is subject to the important practical, financial, infrastructural
and logistical constraints faced by the Court."224 The assignment of a lim-
ited number of common legal representatives for large numbers of
victims has continued. Following the Trial Chamber's reasoning in
Katanga and Ngdujolo,2 5 the Trial Chamber in Bemba adopted a similar
approach, assigning two common legal representatives to represent all of
the victim participants at trial,226 who as of the end of March 2011,
numbered 1,366.227
The high ratio of victim participants to legal representatives may
have negative ramifications for victims. As Executive Director of the
Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, Brigid Inder, has noted, "organ-
ising [sic] the legal representation into only two groups may not be in
the best interests of victims given the large number of individuals the
two legal representatives will have responsibility for during the trial." 228
Notably, the Court is required to ensure that the distinct interests of
victims-particularly victims of crimes involving sexual or gender-based
violence-are represented when selecting a common legal representa-
tive. Yet, it is unlikely this occurred in Bemba, for instance, where-
despite the large number of sexual violence victims participating in the
case-the Chamber arranged the two groups on the basis of geography,230
223. Id.
224. Id. 111.
225. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on
Common Legal Representation of Victims for the Purposes of Trial, 'T 9, 15 (Nov.
10, 2010) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision on the Common Legal Repre-
sentation of Victims].
226. Id. 10.
227. See supra note 155.
228. Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, Statement by the Women's Initiatives for Gen-
der justice on the Opening of the ICC Trial offean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 4 (Nov. 22,
2010), http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/BembaOpening-Statement.pdf.pdf.
229. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 90(4). The rule specifically highlights the interests
of victims as provided in Article 68 of the Rome Statute, which references victims of
crimes involving sexual or gender violence. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 68(1).
230. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision on Common Legal Representation of Victims, supra
note 225, 1 21 (appointing one legal representative to represent Group A (victims
whose applications relate to alleged crimes committed in, or around, Bangui and PK
12), and a second legal representative to represent Group B (victims whose applica-
tions relate to alleged crimes committed in, or around, Damara and Sibut), Group C
(victims whose applications relate to alleged crimes committed in, or around, Boali,
Bossemb6d, Bossangoa and Bozoum) and Group D (victims whose applications relate
to alleged crimes committed in, or around, Mongoumba)).
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rather than on the basis of the nature of the crimes allegedly committed
against the victims. In a more recent case with far fewer victim partici-
pants-against Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus, arising out of the situation in Darfur2 3-the Registry
indicated that although consulting with victims directly on their choice
for common legal representation would allow Registry staff to provide
victims with a forum for their input and to develop a sense of their situ-
ation and concerns, such consultations would be too costly.232 The
statement suggests that direct consultations with victims for the purpose
of selecting a common legal representative are unlikely to occur in the
future, particularly in cases with large numbers of victims. 233
Moreover, as indicated earlier, in the Lubanga case before the ICC,
only three victims-two former child soldiers and a schoolmaster-
addressed the Court directly without being called by either the prosecutor
or the defense.234 In addition, only two of the four victims permitted to
address the Chamber directly in the case against Katanga and Ngudjolo
ended up taking advantage of the opportunity.235 Notably, the way in
231. See supra note 158.
232. Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus,
Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Report on the implementation of the Chamber's Order
instructing the Registry to start consultations on the organisation of common legal
representation, Il 7-8 (June 21, 2011). Instead, the Registry recommended that it
rely on information received when victims originally applied to participate in pro-
ceedings. Id. 1 9.
233. Note that resource and time constraints have led the Court to cut back in other ways
on the potential rights of victims to participate in proceedings, even where they might
otherwise have been qualified to participate. For instance, in the case against Callixte
Mbarushimana, insufficient resources led the Registry to indicate that it could not
meet the deadline set by the Court to process 470 victim applications to participate
in the accused's confirmation of charges hearing. See Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Proposal on Victim Participation in the
Confirmation Hearing, 1 9 (June 6, 2011) (resulting in a decision by the Pre-Trial
Chamber to exclude those applicants from participating in those proceedings); Prose-
cutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision Requesting
Parties to Submit Observations on 124 Applications for Victims' Participation in
Proceedings, 6 (July 4, 2011); see also Hundreds of Victims Prevented from Partici-
pating in Crucial Hearings Due to lack of Resources at the International Criminal
Court, PiEss RELEASE (Redress) July 15, 2011.
234. See generally Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Transcripts (Jan. 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, & 26, 2010).
235. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Notification du retrait de la victime a/0381/09 de la liste des timoins
du reprisentant legal (Jan. 28, 2011); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Notification du retrait de la victime
a/0381/09 de la liste des timoins du reprdsentant legal (Jan. 31, 2011); Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Dici-
sion relative ii la Notification du retrait de la victim a/0363/09 de la liste des timoins
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which victims participated in these trials was quite similar to the way
they would have testified before the Court had they been called as
witnesses by one of the parties. Indeed, while the initial questioning of
victim participants was conducted by their legal representative, rather
than the prosecutor or defense counsel, these victims "gave evidence" 2 36
and were effectively cross-examined by the defense.237 Much like wit-
nesses testifying on behalf of the parties before the ad hoc tribunals,
victim participants addressing the Court were frequently interrupted
and unable to tell their story in their own words. For instance, as the
excerpt below from the transcript in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case in-
dicates, the first victim participant to address the Chamber was
reminded several times to answer the specific questions posed, rather
than being permitted to narrate her story in her own terms:
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam
Witness, you have just been asked to tell us, as you undertook
to say the truth, whether the person whose name is beside the
letter 1 is a person whom you know and with whom you tray-
du reprisentant ligal (Feb. 10, 2011); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Dicision relative ii la Notification du
retrair de la victime a/0363/09 de la liste des timoins du reprisentant Idgal, rendue le
11 f6vrier 2011 (Feb. 21, 2011).
236. As discussed earlier, in its June 2009 decision, the Lubanga Trial Chamber distin-
guished between the right of victim participants to express their views and concerns
and their right, under certain conditions, to give evidence. See supra notes 175-176
and accompanying text. More specifically, the Chamber noted that the expression of
"views and concerns," either by the victim in person or through legal representatives,
does not form part of the evidence of the trial, but may be used to help the Chamber
in its approach to the evidence in the case. Lubanga Decision on the Request by Vic-
tims, supra note 171, 1 25. On the other hand, victim participants wishing to "give
evidence" in the trial must first be placed under oath. Lubanga Decision on the Re-
quest by Victims, supra note 171, 1 25. In both the Lubanga case and the case
against Katanga and Ngudjolo, victim participants were placed under oath before ad-
dressing the Chamber. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript at 6 (Jan. 12, 2010) (swearing in victim); Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Tran-
script at 12 (Feb. 21, 2011) (same).
237. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Tran-
scripts (Jan. 19 & 21, 2010) (examination of second participating victim by
Lubanga's defense counsel); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Transcript at 14 (Feb. 21, 2011) (indicating that
after questions posed to victim participants by their representative and the prosecu-
tion, "the Defence team for Mr. Katanga will take the floor, followed by the Defence
team for Mr. Ngudjolo"); see also id., at 67-77 (cross-examination by defense counsel
for Katanga); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Transcripts (Feb. 22 & 23, 2011) (cross-examination by defense
counsel for Katanga and Ngdujolo).
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elled to The Hague. That is Mr. O'Sheas question, and you
just have to answer that question.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) I just said this. I thought
that I was there-here to talk about my personal story. That is
why I gave you the previous answer.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam
Witness, I understand very well, but as I've said several times,
some of the questions that are being asked of you may seem to
be rather odd or off-putting and may not appear to be related
to what you saw and what you experienced ... but these are
questions that may be important to one of the parties or par-
ticipants, and perhaps even for the Chamber itself. So please
give the best answer you can, to the best of your recollection
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, now I understand. I
thought that I was going to be talking about my personal story
238
Further, although the Court had indicated that it was open to listening
to victims' views and concerns after they had finished giving evidence
under oath, 239 none of the victims appear to have taken advantage of this
opportunity.
Finally, in cases where victims' representatives have tried to present
their clients' stories of sexual and gender-based violence to the Court
despite the absence of such charges against the accused, the Court has
been quick to remind them that exceeding the scope of the charges is
inappropriate. As mentioned earlier, legal representatives of female child
soldiers spoke at some length during opening statements in the Lubanga
trial not only about the fact that girl soldiers had been subjected to vari-
ous forms of sexual and gender-based violence, but also about the
238. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Transcript at 49-50 (Feb. 23, 2011).
239. See Lubanga Decision on the Request by Victims, supra note 171, [ 40.
240. Although, as indicated earlier, much of the testimony given by the three participating
victims occurred in closed session, there is no indication in the public record, at least,
that the victims expressed any views and concerns after they finished giving evidence
under oath. See generally Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, Transcripts (Jan. 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, & 26, 2010) and Prosecu-
tor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Transcripts (Feb. 21, 22, 23, 24 & 25, 2011).
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broader context and the long-term effects of such violence.241 However,
the fact that some of these remarks exceeded the scope of the charges
against the accused escaped neither defense counsel's nor the Court's
notice. As defense counsel noted in her opening statement,
Our main concern about a fair trial is also in relation to the
participation of victims . . . Now, why is the Defence [sic] very
worried at present? . . . Yesterday . . . I listened to much more
than just reference to the crime of enlisting and conscripting. I
heard the word "rape" and "sexual slavery" mentioned. How-
ever, those aren't charges brought against our client. The Legal
Representatives of Victims cannot accuse our client of crimes
which he isn't prosecuted for here.242
The presiding judge of the trial bench expressed a similar concern,
cautioning one legal representative as follows:
Mr. Diakiese, I know it was to a very large extent something of
a flourish of oratory, but it was in a sense an example of some-
thing that we've got to be very careful about in this case in that
the ambit of participation by the victims in this case must be
focused, must be really directed at the evidence that we're go-
ing to be dealing with in this trial and, in particular, the
charges which this accused faces.243
Likewise, at the ECCC, judges have at times limited the ability of civil
parties to bring certain issues or facts to the attention of the court be-
cause of fair trial or efficiency concerns. For example, in the Duch case,
241. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. See also Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript at 47-49 (Jan. 26, 2009) (Victim
Representative Mr. Diakiese noting, "[t]his trial is an opportunity for the victims to
learn the truth and to have right [sic]-a right to justice. The truth about the real
motives that caused them to be torn from their families and sent to fight and to die
for the cause of defending their community. . . . Women and children have been the
hostages of warlords in Ituri while the ship of their destiny has been submerged by
blood. Women and children first. Yes, women and children were given special
treatment. That is to say the women were raped. That is to say the children were
sent into combat in the case of boys, and also used as sex slaves when it came to
girls. These victims respectfully hope that their views and concerns will be taken
into account at this trial.").
242. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript at 16,
18 (Jan. 27, 2009).
243. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript at 70
(Jan. 26, 2009).
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the Chambers refused to admit evidence from a civil party about a par-
ticular incident of rape, in part, because "these allegations were raised at
a late stage in the proceedings . .. [and, therefore,] evidence relevant to
them will be impossible to obtain within reasonable time."24 4 Moreover,
judges regularly interrupted civil parties who were allowed to address the
court, often asking them to restrain themselves emotionally or to restrict
their testimony in other ways. For instance, after one civil party became
visibly upset on the stand following his testimony about being beaten at
the S-21 detention center, the presiding judge asked him to "try to be
strong" and to "recompose" himself so that he would be in a better posi-
tion to recount what happened to him,245 adding that: "[t]oday is the
opportunity for you to reveal, to describe your sufferings [sic] to the
Chamber so that the Chamber can understand. If your emotion over-
whelms you, then it's unlikely that we have another time to hear your
account because the Chamber has scheduled other witnesses to provide
the[ir] testimonies ... 246 Similarly, after another civil party testified
about how she struggled to understand why her husband had been so
mistreated by the Khmer Rouge, the presiding judge cautioned her to
. . . concentrate on the linkages of the time when your husband was
detained and tortured, for example, at S-21. And please don't stray far
away from that matter.,247
Not surprisingly, perhaps, victims' participation rights have, in
some respects, actually been scaled back over the last few years, as the
ICC and the ECCC have struggled with how to give victims a meaning-
ful voice in the process without undermining either the efficiency of
proceedings or fair trial rights of accused. At the ICC, for instance,
while an early Pre-Trial Chamber decision characterized victims' rights
quite broadly, even at the investigation stage, 248 a later Appeals Chamber
decision held that victims do not, in fact, have a general right to partici-
pate at the investigation stage of a situation.24 9 Similarly, judges at the
244. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/
ECCC/TC, Decision on Parties' Requests to Put Certain Matters Before the Cham-
ber Pursuant to Rule 87(2), 1 14 (Oct. 28, 2009).
245. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/
TC, Transcript of Trial Day 37 at 14 (July 1, 2009).
246. Id., at 14-15.
247. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/
ECCC/TC, Transcript of Trial Day 63 at 71 (Aug. 24, 2009).
248. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS
4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 1 12 (Jan. 17, 2006).
249. See Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on Victim Participa-
tion, supra note 197, 1 58; see also Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-01/04-556,
Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings in the
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ECCC have issued a number of decisions constraining the manner in
which civil parties can participate. For instance, during Duch's trial, the
Trial Chamber cautioned civil parties that although they were entitled to
pose questions to witnesses, they were not to be repetitious, "long-
winded," or ask questions outside the confines of the relevant topic.250
Moreover, in response to complaints by defense counsel regarding the
scope of questioning by civil parties during the Duch trial, judges intro-
duced new time limits on questioning mid-trial.251 As one observer
noted, "[a]lthough some Civil Parties felt that this limited their role, the
judges were under pressure to manage the trial process more efficient-
ly."252 Later, the Trial Chamber issued a decision holding that civil
parties could not question the character witnesses for the accused or
appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 3 December
2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I of 6 December 2007, at 16 (Feb. 2, 2009). Interestingly, in June
2010, two victims granted participation status in the DRC situation before the Ap-
peals Chamber issued these decisions requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber review a
decision by the Prosecutor not to investigate Bemba for crimes, including crimes of
sexual violence, allegedly committed by his troops in the DRC. See Situation in
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-564, Demande du representant legal
de VPRS 3 et 6 aux fins de mise en cause de Monsieur Jean-Pierre Bemba en sa quali-
t6 de chef militaire au sens de l'article 28-a du Statut pour les crimes dont ses troupes
sont presumies coupables en Ituri (June 28, 2010). Although the Pre-Trial Chamber
did not address whether the victims had standing to submit their request in light of
the Appeals Chamber decisions rejecting victims' general right to participate at the
investigation stage, it rejected the request on the grounds that the Chamber had no
basis under the Rome Statute to invoke its review powers over the decision of the
Prosecutor in that instance. See Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo,
ICC-01/04-582, Decision on the request of the legal representative of victims VPRS
3 and VPRS 6 to review an alleged decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, at 4-5
(Oct. 25, 2010). In a subsequent decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber made clear that in
view of the Appeals Chamber decisions, the "procedural status" granted to victims at
the investigation stage by earlier decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber could no longer
be sustained. See Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-593,
Decision on victims' participation in proceedings relating to the situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 15 (Apr. 11, 2011).
250. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/
ECCC/TC, Transcript of Trial Day 31 at 98 (June 22, 2009).
251. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/
ECCC/TC, Transcript of Trial Day 35 at 81 (June 29, 2009) (imposing a limit of
ten minutes on each of the four civil party groups for questioning witnesses); id.,
Transcript of Trial Day 37 at 86-86 (July 1, 2009) (denying request by civil party
lawyer for an extra ten minutes to pose questions to a survivor of S-21, despite the
fact that seven civil party lawyers were required to question witness on behalf of over
90 civil parties in 40 minutes).
252. Johanna Herman, Reaching for Justice: The Participation of Victims at the ECCC,
CONFLICT POLICY PAPER No. 5 (The Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, Universi-
ty of East London), Sept. 2010.
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make submissions concerning the sentencing of the accused.253 Signifi-
cantly, the Chamber reasoned that although the civil parry system at the
ECCC is based on Cambodian Criminal Procedure, it is not identical to
the way that system works at the national level and "must be consistent
with the specific nature of criminal proceedings before the ECCC."254
"In this context," the Chamber continued, "features of more traditional
Civil Party models, devised for less complex proceedings with fewer vic-
tims, require[] adaptation. . . . [Thus, a] restrictive interpretation of
rights of Civil Parties in proceedings before the ECCC is required." 255
Even more significantly, perhaps, in anticipation of Case 002
against the surviving senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge-in which
nearly 4,000 victims applied to participate as civil parties 256-the ECCC
radically revised its rules on civil party participation in an effort to
21
streamline the process.25 As described in Section III.B. above, the rules
were changed to require that, at the trial and appeal stages, all civil par-
ties must comprise a single, consolidated group, to be represented by
Lead Co-Lawyers, who in turn will be supported by the lawyers repre-
senting individual civil parties.58 Under these new rules, the "Civil
Party Lead Co-Lawyers [are to] ensure the effective organization of
Civil Party representation during the trial stage and beyond, whilst
balancing the rights of all parties and the need for an expeditious trial
within the unique ECCC context."2 59 This effectively means that vic-
tims will have to relay their views and concerns to the Chambers not
only through their own lawyer but through yet another person whose
job it is to represent not only that victim but also all other victims in the
case-which in Case 002 amounted to 3,850 people.260 Indeed, this has
already resulted in challenges to victim representatives who wish to express
their concerns to the Court directly. For example, at the initial hearing
253. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/
ECCCITC, Decision on Civil Party Co-lawyers' Joint Request for a Ruling on the
Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions
Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses Testifying on
Character (Oct. 9, 2009).
254. Id. J 12.
255. Id. T9 12-13.
256. See siupra note 166 and accompanying text.
257. See 7th Plenary Session of the ECCC Commences Monday 2 February 2010, PREss
RELEASE (ECCC) Jan. 28, 2010, at 1 (noting proposed revisions to ECCC Internal
Rules relating to the representation of Civil Parties are intended to "streamline and
consolidate Civil Party participation in advance of the commencement of the trial" in
Case 002).
258. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
259. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12ter (1).
260. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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held by the Trial Chamber in that case, one of the civil party repre-
sentatives was given an opportunity to address the Chamber on the
proposed witness list for the trial.26' When she tried to explain why the
proposed witnesses might not adequately be able to address the Khmer
21Rouge's policy regarding the regulation of marriage, 2however, she was
cut off by the Chambers and reminded that civil parties were to be
"led by the lead co-lawyers, who should have the primary role in these
proceedings in representing the consolidated group." 263
In sum, it appears that victim participants at these tribunals have
suffered some of the very same challenges victim-witnesses faced at the
ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. At the end of the day, these proceedings
remain criminal trials with significant time and logistical constraints,
making it difficult to accommodate the desire of victims to tell their
stories or to talk about their experiences on their own terms. Indeed, in
light of the recent restrictions on victim participation, particularly in
cases where large numbers of victims are expected to participate, it is
not at all clear that victims will be able to communicate a richer, more
nuanced picture of their experiences than they were able to in the con-
text of the ad hoc tribunals or the SCSL.
C Unintended Consequences of Victim Participation Schemes
One of the most troubling aspects of these findings is that these
schemes raised-and continue to raise-high expectations that the ICC
and ECCC will serve the interests of victims better than did the ad
hoc or hybrid tribunals and that, therefore, more victims will be
heard, and more of their stories told, than would have been possible at
those tribunals. Indeed, such expectations were articulated as recently
as last year by some of the victims who made representations to the
ICC in connection with the prosecutor's proprio motu investigation of
the situation in Kenya under Article 15(3).264 In its report to the
Court's Pre-Trial Chamber assigned to the Kenya situation, the Regis-
trar noted "[o]n some issues it appears that unrealistically high
expectations already exist about what the ICC can achieve in Kenya,"
mentioning as an example of this "[t] he desire of many victims to give
evidence about their experiences . . . and the belief that most or many
261. See Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC,
Transcript of Trial Day 36 at 27 (June 30, 2011).
262. Id. at 27, 29-31.
263. Id. at 33.
264. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
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victims and eye-witnesses will have a chance to testify at the ICC."265 As
the Registrar's comments and my initial assessment suggest, this is not
likely to happen.
Furthermore, these expectations seem particularly problematic in
cases against those most responsible for planning, organizing or
masterminding serious international crimes, the focus of the ICC's and
ECCC's prosecution efforts today.2 66 The mass number of victims
265. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Report on Victims' Representations, supra note
161, T 18. Notably, the ICC's own Victim Participation Guide, available on its web-
site, notes in response to the question "What might a victim expect from
participating in proceedings?" the following: "By presenting their own views and con-
cerns to the judges, victims are given a voice in the proceedings that is independent of
the Prosecutor. This will help the judges to obtain a clear picture of what happened
to them or how they suffered . .. . This may lead to having an impact on the way
proceedings are conducted and in the outcomes." Booklet on Victims Before the Inter-
national Criminal Court: A Guide for the Participation of Victims in the Proceedings of
the Court, 16, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8FF91A2C-5274-4DCB-9CCE-
37273C5E9AB4/282477/160910VPRSBookletEnglish.pdf.
266. Both the ICC and the ECCC limit their ability to conduct comprehensive prosecu-
tions of the massive crimes within their jurisdiction to high level perpetrators through
some combination of statute, mandate, prosecutorial policy, and limited resources.
With respect to the ECCC, see ECCC Establishment Law, supra note 16, at art. I
("The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea
and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambo-
dian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international
conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from
17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979."). With respect to the ICC, see Office of the Pros-
ecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, p. 7, Interna-
International Criminal Court, Sept. 2003, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905 Policy-Paper.
pdf (noting that, as early as 2003, "[t]he concept of gravity should not be exclusively
attached to the act that constituted the crime but also to the degree of participation
in its commission" and announcing in September 2003 that, as a matter of policy, it
would "focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who
bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation alleg-
edly responsible for those crimes"). The OTP has repeatedly reaffirmed its adherence
to this policy, including in its September 2006 "Report on Prosecutorial Strategy."
Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, p. 5, International Criminal
Court, Sept. 14, 2006 ("The second principle guiding the Prosecutorial Strategy is
that of focused investigations and prosecutions. Based on the Statute, the Office
adopted a policy of focusing its efforts on the most serious crimes and on those who
bear the greatest responsibility for these crimes."). See abo Office of the Prosecutor,
Statement by the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps, p. 4, Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Feb. 12, 2004 ("We have proposed a consensual division of
labour with the DRC. We would contribute by prosecuting the leaders who bear the
greatest responsibility for crimes committed on or after 1 July 2002. National au-
thorities, with the assistance of the international community, could implement
appropriate mechanisms to address other responsible individuals."); Office of the
Prosecutor, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants, p. 3,
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potentially affected in these cases means that the number of victims who
might qualify to participate in proceedings267 may well reach into the
thousands. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, while 122 and 366 persons
have been granted victim status in the Lubanga and Katanga cases,
respectively, 1,366 victim applications were granted in the case against
Bemba,2 68 the highest-level accused to be tried by the ICC thus far.269
Similarly, while only 90 victims participated in the Duch case, over
3,800 have been accepted as civil parties in Case 002 against the most
senior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders.270 As the recent rule changes at the
ECCC suggest, when the number of victims reaches this level, the ability
of individual victims to tell their story on their own terms is significantly
restricted.2 7 ' Thus, the expectation that the victim participation schemes
will allow survivors of sexual and gender-based violence to communicate a
more comprehensive picture of their experiences than they would have
been able to as victim-witnesses before the Yugoslav and Rwanda
tribunals seems unrealistic. In light of the extensive harm victims of
these crimes likely already suffered, unduly raising expectations that are
unlikely to be met seems inappropriate at best.
IV. "THE TASK OF SEEING WOMEN: 272 OTHER ALTERNATIVES?
If, as the preceding discussion suggests, victim participation
schemes at the ICC and ECCC have fallen short of expectations, per-
haps we should acknowledge the limits of participation during criminal
proceedings and explore alternative possibilities that might be as, if not
better, suited to the "task of seeing women." In doing so, I do not want
to suggest that we throw the baby out with the bathwater. Victim partic-
International Criminal Court, Oct. 14, 2005 ("[O]ur mandate is to investigate and
prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility.").
267. See ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 85(a) (defining "victim" as "natural persons who
have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction
of the ICC").
268. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
269. As mentioned supra, Bemba was a vice president in the DRC and the leader of the
Movement for Liberation of Congo (MLC) rebel group. See supra note 154 and ac-
companying text.
270. See supra note 167.
271. See Interview with Eric Stover, supra note 192 (noting that although one of most
positive developments of civil party participation at the ECCC was the formation of a
victim association that was able to speak with a collective voice on behalf of victims,
this also resulted in the loss of individual victims' voices).
272. This phrase is taken from Doris Buss's article entitled The Curious Visibility of War-
time Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law. See Buss, supra note
9, at 4 .
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ipation, as I mentioned, has made a difference for some victims.273 In-
deed, many of the victims who participated in the Duch trial
indicated some level of satisfaction with their participation in those pro-
ceedings.274 Moreover, as others have cautioned, "extricating [victims]
from the process altogether may leave many of them asking whose jus-
tice is being administered, and for whom?" 275
Yet, while I do not believe that victim participation schemes ought
to be abandoned altogether, I think it is critical that we acknowledge the
limits of what can be achieved through these schemes and begin to in-
vest in exploring alternative ways to complement the limited trial
process by providing space for victims to tell their stories in other ven-
ues.2 16 While a full exploration of possible alternatives is beyond the
scope of this Article, I would like to offer a few initial thoughts on this
question.
Truth and reconciliation commissions ("TRCs")-designed to es-
tablish a historical record of human rights violations without necessarily
leading to individual criminal prosecution-are clearly one option.
Although critiques of early TRCs highlighted that "[i]ssues of gender"
,,17
were generally "not . . . seen as relevant to their mandate, more recent
273. See supra note 170-194 and accompanying text. Commentators have, likewise, sug-
gested that even the more traditional form of participation as a victim-witness has
been meaningful for some victims. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 22, at 118 (noting, for
some victims, "participation in war crimes trials may provide some degree of satisfac-
tion unavailable to [victims] in the nonlegal realm"); Kendall & Staggs, supra note 8,
at 366 (maintaining that if the SCSL had extricated-rather than just limited-the
testimony of victims of sexual violence from the proceedings in the CDF case alto-
gether, the witnesses would have been rendered "entirely voiceless at a critical
juncture in [their] journey towards justice"); Dembour & Haslam, supra note 59, at
156 (contending that ending victim participation in international trials because of the
inherent weaknesses in the system "may silence victims even further unless new plat-
forms are created where victims can recount their stories in a socially significant
way").
274. See Stover, supra note 192.
275. See Kendall & Staggs, supra note 8, at 366.
276. This question has certainly been raised by feminist activists and others in response to
the serious challenges victim-witnesses faced at the ad hoc tribunals. See, e.g., Dem-
bour & Haslam, supra note 59, at 171 ("We ask whether the creation . . . of a space
for the victims to tell their stories in non-legal arenas would be at least as, if not
more, beneficial to them than their participation at the ICTY.").
277. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 379,
391 (1999). See also ELISABETH REHN & ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR
AND PEACE: THE INDEPENDENT EXPERTs' ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED
CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND WOMEN'S ROLE IN PEACE-BUILDING 99 (Gloria Jacobs
ed., 2002) (noting that, "[rleportedly most truth commissions have not been proac-
tive in seeking out, encouraging or facilitating testimony from women"). The authors
also point out that commissioners have sometimes "perceive[d] crimes against women
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TRCs have been praised for addressing gender issues in a comprehensive
manner. Referring to the TRC set up in Sierra Leone after the civil war
there in the 1990s, for instance, one commentator lauded the final re-
port produced by that Commission, noting that it "offered a complex
account of the social, legal, political and cultural forces that conspired to
render women more vulnerable to a range of outrages and degradations
in [that conflict] .,278 Notably, in 2002, a report commissioned by the
United Nations Development Fund for Women proposed the estab-
lishment of an international TRC on violence against women in armed
conflict, in part to "develop a more comprehensive record and under-
standing of the full scale of violations [against women in armed
conflict.]" 279 At the same time, however, other commentators have noted
that one reason victims prefer trials over these commissions is that trials
are perceived as providing stronger moral condemnation than TRCs,
which have been characterized as transitional justice mechanisms with
low expressive power.280 Moreover, at the national level, a number of
TRCs have suffered from significant political pressure as well as accusa-
tions of corruption, both of which have tended to undermine their
legitimacy and effectiveness. 281 If the point of the feminist goal of visibil-
ity is not just so that women can tell their stories, but so that they can
do so in a meaningful and socially significant way, TRCs alone may not
be the ideal option.282
The critical question, then, is how to make the more complex and
subtle narratives of women's experiences "fully visible" to those whose
actions and decisions affect the lives of women emerging from conflict,
mass violence, or repression. Although there are undoubtedly a number
of possibilities, including educational efforts by civil society groups, in-
ternational organizations, and the media aimed at publicizing the plight
as non-political, or unrelated to the type of violence that they are investigating,"
which "was the case in South Africa where some members of the South African Am-
nesty Committee are said to have believed that rape was a non-political crime, outside
the reach of their investigation." Id.
278. Franke, supra note 9, at 827.
279. REHN & JOHNSON SIRLEAF, Supra note 277, at 99.
280. See Feminism v. Feminism: What is a Feminist Approach to Transnational Criminal
Law, ASIL Proceedings of 102nd Annual Meeting, 274-278 (2008) (remarks of pan-
elist Ron Slye); see also Alexander Servos, The Case for an International Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, bepress Legal Series Paper 1210, at 15 (2006) (noting that
a "major problem facing TRCs when compared to ICTs is a relative lack of pres-
tige").
281. See Servos, supra note 280, at 14-17.
282. Buss, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that it is the process of "making women visible to
international policy actors" that "has been a central strategic goal" for feminist schol-
ars and activists).
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of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence more broadly,283 the
establishment and operation of the ICC and ECCC has opened up
space for the development of other tribunal-related mechanisms that
offer a unique opportunity to further this goal. Indeed, as discussed be-
low, both the ICC and ECCC have expanded their work with victims to
include the creation of "non-judicial programs" designed to reach a
broader category of victims than can participate in trial proceedings. If
properly resourced, these programs could provide survivors of sexual
and gender-based violence a new and important venue to tell their sto-
ries on their own terms, thus complementing the inevitably limited
284
narratives that emerge through criminal proceedings.
For instance, in 2010, the ECCC expanded the mandate of the
Victim Support Section ("VSS") to include "the development and im-
plementation of non-judicial programs and measures addressing the
broader interests of victims." 285 "Such programs," the Rules note, "may,
where appropriate, be developed and implemented in collaboration with
governmental and non-governmental organizations external to the
ECCC.""6 Although it is still unclear how the VSS will implement this
new mandate, the VSS has organized a series of forums designed to
reach out to civil parties in Case 002 and to discuss, among other
things, proposals and resources necessary for the implementation of
non-judicial measures.287 Interestingly, in the context of one such forum,
Mr. Pich Ang, the new Cambodian Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer, invited
forum guests to share their stories about how they had suffered under
283. See, e.g., Our Bodies-Their Battle Ground: Gender-based Violence in Conflict Zones
(Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, Sept. 2004), http://www.irinnews.org/film/?id=4128.
284. One other obvious way to increase victims' opportunity to tell their stories is by al-
lowing them to present their views and concerns to the court during the sentencing
phase of proceedings. However, it is unclear how the ICC will address the issue of
sentencing, as it has yet to reach the sentencing stage in any of the cases now before
it. Miore significantly, as mentioned above, the ECCC issued a decision in the Duch
case holding that civil parties could not make submissions concerning the sentencing
of the accused. SeeCo-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-
07-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Civil Party Co-lawyers' joint request for a ruling
on the standing of Civil Party lawyers to make submissions on sentencing and direc-
tions concerning the questioning of the accused, experts and witnesses testifying on
character (Oct. 9, 2009). Thus, while this remains a possibility worth exploring in
the future, it is not addressed here.
285. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12bis(3).
286. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 13, at R. 12bis(3).
287. See, e.g., The VSS Provided Training to Additional 148 Focal Persons in Case 002 At
Grand Ballroom, Imperial Hotel Phnom Penh, ECCC, Press Alert (Nov. 26, 2010),
vss.eccc.gov.kh/en/component/docman/catview (follow "Report and Study" hyper-
link; then follow "Training for Trainers 26 November 2010" hyperlink).
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the Khmer Rouge regime.288 Of the four victims who responded, three
spoke of incidences of gender violence:
One victim recounted how she was taken to be killed after re-
fusing to be forcibly married. She was very lucky to escape.
The second recounted how she had been forcibly married on
two separate occasions, and lost 10 siblings.
The third told of how her father was killed in front of her
while all her brothers were killed in Tuol Sleng. She was forci-
289bly married at 14, and feels sick to recall these events.
It appears that this forum provided victims of sexual and gender-
based violence with a space where they felt able to share their experiences
without being silenced by the rigid procedures required by trial proceed-
ings. Indeed, although geared in large part toward those granted civil party
status, these VSS forums represent an opportunity, as one report has
noted, to "reach a broader range of victims than the Civil Parties."290 If
such opportunities are formally incorporated into the work of the VSS
and such stories are memorialized and distributed broadly, they may
well contribute to a deeper understanding of the ways in which wom-
en experienced gender violence during the Khmer Rouge, without
subjecting them to the limitations facing civil parties during trial pro-
*291
ceedings.
The ICC's Trust Fund for Victims ("TFV"), which operates in situ-
ations where the prosecutor has opened investigations, has a similarly
broad mandate. Although the TFV's primary mandate is to assist the
288. Id. at 6.
289. Id.
290. Herman, supra note 252, at 7. The report also suggests that "[p]roviding victims with
opportunities to get information, be heard and engage with others will reduce the
impact of those who were rejected as Civil Parties and help many more who did not
apply." Herman, supra note 252, at 7. Notably, Pre-Trial Chamber Judge Marchi-
Uhel makes a similar point in her partially dissenting opinion to the Chamber's deci-
sion overturning the OCIJ's rejection of 1,728 civil party applications in Case 002.
See Nuon Chea et al., Decision on Appeals Against Orders, supra note 196, Partially
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Marchi-Uhel, 15 (". . . I have no doubt that the non
judicial measures in question may have a broader scope and benefit to the victims in
parallel to the judicial process, including to those who do not qualify as civil par-
ties.").
291. Notably, Mr. Van Nat, one of the civil parties who participated in the Duch case,
indicated during the forum that "[allthough he was grateful to have his story told and
recorded [during the Duch trial], he found the testimony process difficult and trau-
matic." ECCC, Press Alert, supra note 287, at 2.
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Court in administering court-ordered reparations awards,292 it also has a
second mandate, which is to assist victims in situation countries under
the Court's jurisdiction, even if they do not have a link to the particular
crimes or suspects under investigation by the Court.9 Currently, "the
TFV is providing a broad range of support under its second mandate-
including vocational training, counselling [sic], reconciliation work-
shops, reconstructive surgery and more-to an estimated 70,000 victims
of crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction." 294 The TFV employs several
strategies in implementing this mandate, including tailoring "projects
... to meet the needs of victims of specific crimes. " For instance, in
2008, the TFV issued a global appeal for funds to support survivors of
sexual and gender-based violence in Uganda and the DRC.296 More re-
cently, the TFV launched a similar initiative to assist victims of sexual
violence in the CAR.297
The TFV is particularly attentive to giving victims a voice and
regularly consults with the victim population in designing their pro-
grams. 298 As discussed above, it appears that the ECCC has also begun a
process of consultation with the victim community to discuss proposals
and resources necessary for the implementation of non-judicial
292. ICC Rules, supra note 108, at R. 98(2)-(4).
293. See Learning from the TFYs Second Mandate: From Implementing Rehabilitation Assis-
tance to Reparations, PROGRAMME PROGREss REPORT (ICC Trust Fund for Victims), 4
(2010), http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/imce/TFV Programme
Report Fall 2010.pdf (characterizing the TFV's second mandate as "providing victims
and their families with physical rehabilitation, material support, and/or psychological re-
habilitation where the ICC has jurisdiction"); Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC Trust
Fund for Victims.- Beyond the Realm of the ICC, RADIo NETHERLAND'S WORLDWIDE,
Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/icc-trust-fund-victims-
beyond-realm-icc. The TFV can assist this broader category of victims as long as it noti-
fies the ICC about its projects and receives approval for its proposed activities. Id
294. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TRUST FUND, http://www.tustfundforvictins.org/ (last
visited Aug. 5, 2011).
295. Id.
296. Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the Activities and Projects of the Board ofDi-
rectors of the Trust Fund for Victims for the period 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, ICC-
ASP/10/14, at 5 (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 TFV Report to ICC].
297. Trust Fund for Victims Launches Programme in the Central African Republic, PRESS
RELEASE (ICC) June 16, 2011, www.icc-cip.int/NR/exeres/82C5A557-5B17-432
C-8F43-CC5C68FEC4A9.htm.
298. 2011 TFV Report to ICC, supra note 296, at 2 (noting that a "participatory pro-
gramme planning process provides the basis for designing rehabilitation activities so
that local partners and victim survivors are involved in designing local interventions"
and that the TFV, therefore, "continued its practice of working with local grassroots
organizations, victims' survivor groups, women's associations," among others, in
'administering the general assistance mandate").
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measures,2 99 including with those not officially participating in the trial
process.soo Perhaps in the context of these consultations, victims will be
able to tell their stories unfettered by selective prosecutorial strategies or
the limiting rules of procedure and evidence that have rendered partici-
pation less than meaningful for victims before the ICC and ECCC,
particularly victims of sexual and gender-based violence.
One of the impediments to using these consultation processes as
venues for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence to tell their sto-
ries is that both the ICC's TFV and the ECCC's VSS are currently
underfunded and underdeveloped. Although assistance to victims par-
ticipating in the course of proceedings is currently supported through
the official budget of each court' the expanded victim assistance man-
date of each court is only partially funded through the courts' core
budgets.302 Much of it has been, or is expected to be, funded through
299. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
300. Indeed, in a recent report, the ECCC noted that "[t]hroughout March and April, the
VSS Reparations and Non-Judicial Measures Team met with several stakeholders [in-
cluding NGOs working with victims] in order to build up its future framework for
the implementation of non-judicial measures for victims." ECCC Court Report, 8
(May 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/publications/May%202011%
20Court%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
301. Regarding the ICC, see, e.g., Proposed Programme Budget for 2012 of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/10/10, 82 (July 21, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocslasp-docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-10-ENG.pdf [hereinafter ICC 2012
Proposed Programme Budget] (proposing budget of C537,800 for the ICC's
Office of Public Counsel for Victims and E1,873,000 for the ICC's Victims
Participation and Reparations Section). Regarding the ECCC, see ECCC Revised
BudgetRequirements-2010-2011, at 6, 14-15 (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www
.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/fdes/revised budgeeccc 2010-2011.pdf [hereinafter ECCC
Revised Budget 2010-2011] (proposing United Nations budget $296,100 for Civil
Party Lead Co-Lawyers Section and additional monies from Cambodia for that Sec-
tion and the Civil Party Lawyers Team).
302. Although the ICC TFV's administrative costs are funded through the Court's official
budget, the specific projects it supports pursuant to its general assistance mandate are
funded entirely through external voluntary contributions. Compare ICC 2012 Pro-
posed Programme Budget, supra note 301, at 152 (proposing budget of C1,755,800
for the TFV's Secretariat), with The Two Roles of the TFV: Reparations and General
Assistance, http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv (last visited Sept. 21,
2011) (noting that the TFV's general assistance mandate is funded using voluntary
contributions from donors). Similarly, while the ECCC's Victim Witness Unit is
funded through the ECCC's official budget, funding for projects related to the VSS's
expanded mandate to develop "non-judicial" programs will have to "come from out-
side the court's core budget." Compare ECCC Revised Budget 2010-2011, supra
note 301, at 14-15, with Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 17 (Dec. 2010), http://
www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles-publications/publications/cambodia-report-
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voluntary contributions, which until now have been limited.303 Perhaps
encouraging states and other stakeholders to invest in the ICC's TFV
and the ECCC's VSS-both of which remain connected to the work of
the tribunals and might therefore be perceived as having greater con-
demnatory power than TRCs operating independently of the criminal
justice process-will help challenge the dominant narratives that remain
visible through international criminal trials, even through their novel
victim participation schemes. Indeed, if enough resources are dedicat-
ed to the expanded victim assistance mandate at the ICC and ECCC,
the consultation processes they engage in may well contribute to a
richer understanding of the complex ways in which sexual and gender-
based violence and inequality is experienced by women in situations of
war or mass violence and, ultimately, assist us in our task of better
"seeing" women.
20101207/cambodia-khmer-rouge-report-20101207.pdf [hereinafter Recent Devel-
opments at the ECCC].
303. For recent ICC TFV figures, see Financial Info, http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/
financial-info (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). With respect to the ECCC's VSS, note that
even its primary mandate has been underfunded. See Recent Developments at the
ECCC, supra note 302, at 18 ("The court, funded by voluntary contributions from
UN member states and the government of Cambodia, remains in a dire financial sit-
uation. Fundraising shortfalls for 2010 have resulted in cutbacks in some court
operations, such as VSS activities, and in delays in replacing staff who resign.").
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